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Supervisory lessons: management traits of problem banks

Aristóbulo de Juan highlights lessons he has learnt from management of problem banks

Regulation and compliance

Poor management and ineffective supervision often trigger bank failures, and may outweigh macro factors as causal or aggravating conditions. Bad management and weak supervision are closely bound up together. Irrespective of the macro context, when supervision is lenient, good bankers may tend to become bad in a behavioural process that typically develops over four sequential stages.

First stage: incompetence

While there may be other causes, current losses and undercapitalisation or insolvency generally appear as a result of rapid growth and poor lending. Indeed, excess liquidity leads to runaway expansion – both major causes of crises. To paraphrase Karl Marx, if “religion is the opium of the people”, it could be said that excess liquidity is “the opium of the banker”. It dulls her sense of risk.

Other than excess liquidity, concentration of risk in specific borrowers, or groups of borrowers, in industries or products is likely to prove deadly over time. Real estate, mortgages and ‘toxic’ financial products are the quintessential examples from the current crisis. Concentration in connected lending is particularly poisonous. The mismatch of terms between assets and liabilities (whether as agreed originally with the customers or forced by the default or refinancing of the lenders) may lead to an escalation of serious liquidity problems. Extravagant expenditure can also be mentioned as another feature of incompetence.

Second stage: cosmetics

The ‘bad banker’ spiral emerges. Many bankers in trouble refuse to address their problems while they are still manageable. They prefer to sweep them under the carpet, using cosmetic accounting to buy time and retain economic control and social influence.

Third stage: desperate measures

By definition, cosmetic accounting can never actually solve problems, and as an organisation’s difficulties mount, the bad banker will be tempted to hazard all on high-risk borrowers and speculation, which only escalates losses and perverts professional practices. It is important to stress that, contrary to conventional economic wisdom, high risk is not necessarily offset by high interest rates. Rather, the high-risk lender will often fail to collect any interest and may even lose the principal. As one friend of mine says: “What matters is not the notional return on assets per books but the actual return of assets.”

Fourth stage: malpractice

When disaster looms, bad bankers all too often resort to malpractice, which may take a variety of forms, most of them involving connected lending and even self-lending. In a nutshell, bad bankers tend to siphon money out of their institutions in situations of stress, rather than injecting fresh resources. “This is legitimate. It’s the government’s fault, not mine. It’s my children’s bread,” may be the common refrain.

Nobody dares to intervene

The problem is that insolvency often sprouts unnoticed in periods of prosperity. A growing economy that generates lots of jobs and burgeoning tax receipts is very attractive for governments of all political persuasions, whatever the risk and future cost. Nobody dares to ‘rain on the parade’ – not even supervisors. Problems remain hidden in the books. Meanwhile, cronyism between politicians, bankers and borrowers may also play their part.

How is that possible? In general, it is done by exploiting the gaps and ambiguities in prudential regulation, and by flawed compliance, abetted by ineffective or overly amicable supervision. The main cosmetic technique used is to ‘refinance’ irrecoverable loans, which can be done in many ways. Refinancing good loans in a realistic hope of recovery may prove a normal practice, but the widespread habit of ‘evergreening’ bad ones certainly is not. It prevents transparency, and is a serious obstacle to supervision.

Refinancing bad loans and other cosmetic practices result in the paradox that the worst loans (in terms of risk and size) are not recognised as past due or impaired in the books. This offers an important lesson: since the accounting entry of ‘arrears’ is often an optimistic and meaningless minimum, supervisors should look not at bad assets as recognised in the books when examining a bank, but rather at ‘good’ ones. The loans that are booked as bad tend to be smaller, and are already in the hands of the legal department. The worst transactions, however, are all too often carefully disguised. Furthermore, as put by the late Bill Taylor of the US Federal Reserve, “the larger a bank is, the more difficult it will be to manage, control and supervise”. In this light, supervisors could usefully be urged to carefully look at ‘good’ banks, rather than insisting on those already identified as problematic.

When cosmetic practices prevail, the worst assets are generally underprovisioned or not provisioned at all. Moreover, non-recoverable accruals tend to be recognised as income, even where they are financed by the lender itself. Their fictitious nature and the negative impact on cashflows tend to be ignored. The consequences are grave:

  • A part of the earnings, provisions, reserves and equity reflected in the problem bank’s books are also fictitious. However, taxes, dividends and indeed bonuses continue to be paid, thus escalating losses and eating up liquidity. This only compounds the effects of ongoing bad management, and adds to the continuous burden of financing the stock of non-performing assets.
  • No corrective action is taken by management either at the board or executive level – or, indeed, by supervisors.

In such a context, insolvency can grow unnoticed like a cancer, while the banks concerned continue to enjoy easy access to funds in the market, taking new deposits and borrowing on the strength of bogus accounts and high remuneration of those resources. Long-term assistance from governments and international institutions may also make life comfortable, allowing management to disregard insolvency and discouraging adjustment. As a result, the true situation is not revealed, as a rule, until banks become illiquid or supervision becomes stringent. Until such a time, bad managers, auditors and supervisors often prefer to turn a blind eye, applying a lax interpretation of accounting and prudential rules. As a rule of thumb, then, one may infer that when a bank needs growing liquidity assistance for a few months, it will probably have undisclosed insolvency problems and its difficulties are all too likely to grow.

When it comes to asset evaluation, there is a need to be strict on forbearance: it is safer for bankers and supervisors to overestimate than to underestimate losses. Experience tells supervisors that losses in difficult times will always prove deeper than initially admitted by managers, auditors and even the toughest supervisor. It is human nature. Provisions are inimical to dividends and bonuses. Consequently, the beneficiaries of such distributions are often keen to avoid provisions.

The history of financial crises also shows that there are five different levels of estimated losses. Each level sequentially multiplies the previous one by two (or almost by two) in the following rough pattern:

  • First, the banker does not recognise any losses at all or, at best, recognises losses amounting to, say, half of capital.
  • The external auditor then steps in, and may dare to report that losses are actually twice as deep as the bank’s estimates.
  • Official bank examiners then inspect the bank and once again double the auditor’s estimate of losses, often triggering tough corrective action and/or intervention.
  • The bank is then placed under public administration or nationalised, and the government administrators or interveners, now working from inside the institution, double the losses found by the bank examiners yet again.
  • Finally, when the ailing bank is put up for sale, the potential buyer’s due diligence procedures find that actual losses were twice as big again as even the government’s administrators were willing to admit. Although it is not unknown for buyers to overstate their case as a form of insurance against unpleasant surprises, overall buyers are usually not far wrong in their assessments.

All these things happen because of the lack of firm government control, whether in the regulatory and supervisory field and/or when it comes to resolution. Good regulation is necessary, but it proves useless without proper supervision. Good supervision is also necessary, therefore. However, neither regulation nor supervision can really help without sound resolution mechanisms, so good resolution mechanisms are also necessary, but, however sound the mechanisms may be, they will prove futile if regulation and supervision are weak. Also, a lack of sound resolution mechanisms or lack of resolution willingness may inhibit good supervision.

Regulation, supervision and resolution thus form an interlocking package that cannot be applied piecemeal. In the end, it is a vicious circle. If only one or two components are in place, implementing the third is likely to prove ineffective and a waste of effort. The system could be likened to a high-fidelity chain – as good or as bad as its weakest component.

Read the rest of the series 

Part 2: Fault lines in prudential regulation

Part 3: The need for intrusive supervision

Part 4: Resolution is a ‘dirty business’

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