Trends in reserve management: 2026 survey results

This annual survey of reserve managers was conducted by Central Banking Publications from January to early March 2026. The survey, which is the 22nd in the annual HSBC Reserve Management Trends series, was made possible by the support and co-operation of the reserve managers who take part in it. They contributed on the condition that neither their names nor those of their central banks would be mentioned in this report.

Summary of key findings

• Geopolitical tensions are the most significant risk that reserve managers face in 2026. Of 99 central banks, 69 (69.7%) voted it their top concern.
• Inflation and interest rates remained the most important factors expected to affect reserve management over the next five years. In yet another sign that geopolitical risks are now seen as more pressing, a higher share of reserve managers voted geopolitics their most significant risk in the medium term than in 2025, citing rising geopolitical fragmentation, sanctions risk and geoeconomic competition.
• The US bond market has suffered a significant markdown in investor confidence among central bank reserve managers year on year. This year, 32.9% think US bonds will outperform other Group of Seven economies and China, down from 54.3% in 2025 and 71.1% in 2024.
• A majority of central banks that incorporate geopolitical risks into their reserve management and asset allocation made changes in the last 12 months: 82.6% – up from 72.6% in 2025 and 53.6% in 2024. A significantly higher proportion of respondents also considered changes. Globally, the most common changes continued to be to issuers and counterparties. However, a higher share of central banks made changes to their gold allocation. Slightly more central banks made changes to the asset classes they invest in than the currencies they invest in.
• In a new question for this year, reserve managers were asked about the location of assets: 14.5% reported making changes, and this was the change that other central banks were most likely to be considering (33.3%).
• In another new question this year, 83 of 100 respondents said they use active management strategies with the objective of outperforming their benchmark. Popular strategies used are yield-curve positioning and duration management. Credit spread positioning and relative value trading are also widely deployed.
• Just over half of 93 respondents said they see their FX and gold reserves increasing in 2026. Notably, servicing external obligations has become more of a priority. Greater liquidity needs in uncertain markets overtook FX interventions as a primary driver.
• A higher proportion of respondents plan to increase their reserves via purchases of locally mined gold: 33.3%, up from 21.7% in 2025.
• Of 94 central banks, 50.0% intervened in FX markets in the last 12 months. Central banks often do not publicly announce FX interventions – rendering them both at once an incredibly important and underreported tool. Removing eurozone central banks from analysis, this rose to 58.8%.
• More reserve managers expect the pace of diversification globally to accelerate this year (69.1%) than last year (50.6%).
• Over the last 12 months, central banks were most likely to increase their duration or increase their liquidity.
• Over the next 12 months, more than half of the respondents said they expect to prioritise asset diversification (53.8%). Over one-third expect to increase their exposure to gold (38.5%) and different currencies (37.4%).
• Liquidity becomes the most important objective for foreign reserves in times of acute stress. To manage this, most central banks use Treasury bills (83.2%). One hundred and one central banks addressed this question.
• Beyond the core reserve currencies, including the US dollar, euro, sterling and yen, a group of mid-sized western economies, or allies of the West, continue to receive investments from a wide set of central banks. Chief among them is the Australian dollar, which 46.7% of central banks reported investing in.
• This year, central banks are most likely to be considering investing in onshore and/or offshore renminbi.
• While some 10% of central banks reported investing in the South African rand, in terms of the other original five Brics members, less than 5% of central banks reported investing in either the Brazilian real or Indian rupee.
• Close to three-quarters of central banks invest in gold (72.6%), up slightly from 69.4% last year. Fifteen central banks said they are considering investing in gold now (15.8%), and 3 (3.2%) said they would consider investing in 5–10 years’ time. Just 8 (8.4%) said they have no interest in investing.
• Most central banks that invest in gold treat it as a separate asset class (66.7%), rather than include it in their strategic asset allocation. Around one-third of central banks with gold holdings are considering adding the precious metal (36.8%) over the next 12 months. However, 27.9% said the current price of gold is preventing them from making further purchases.
• Two central banks said they are planning to repatriate their gold.
• Reserve managers were divided on whether there will be a correction in gold markets by the end of the year. Of 60 respondents to this question, 30.0% said they expect the price to be around $5,000 per ounce, while 31.7% said they expect the price of gold to be $6,000 or higher.
• Just two central banks reported investing in silver, with three considering investing now and four considering investing in 5–10 years. The vast majority of central banks however reported having no interest in investing in silver (89.9%).
• In terms of equities, 24.4% of respondents said they are investing in developed markets, but just 8.0% said they are investing in emerging markets.
• No central banks reported having made any investments in stablecoins or cryptocurrencies, but a few said they would consider doing so in 5–10 years’ time, signifying a small shift in sentiment. Around one-quarter (26.8%) said they think digital currencies are becoming more credible as an asset class, although most limit this to central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
• Just over half of central banks are against a strategic bitcoin reserve fund (53.4%), but a significant number (45.5%) are unsure, signalling a move towards uncertainty, rather than outright rejection.
• Year on year, the small group of reserve managers (11.3%) that think de-dollarisation is not increasing is getting smaller, and the group of those who think it will accelerate (9.3%) is getting a little bigger. Most expect de-dollarisation to continue on a gradual basis, spurred by geopolitical fragmentation. The majority of 73 respondents (91.8%) expect the share of renminbi in global reserves to be 4% or higher by 2035. However, one-third of central banks do not expect to invest any of their reserves in the renminbi by then.
• Nevertheless, regarding the US dollar’s status, 23.2% of reserve managers said they strongly agree and 56.8% said they agree that it is still the safe-haven currency, however attacks on the Federal Reserve’s independence may shake confidence.
• Among central banks that changed the composition of their USD portfolio, exposure to US Treasuries saw a net increase (32.5%), as did sovereign, supranational and agency (SSA) bonds (27.5%).
• A key tenor of US policy is that stablecoins will drive demand for US Treasuries, thereby supporting the position of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. However, 30.0% of central banks disagreed with this proposition, and 54.4% of central banks questioned it, saying they are unsure.
• Central banks are split on whether the renminbi has become a more attractive currency: 52.2% agreed, but 47.8% said it has become a less attractive currency.
• Views on the euro this year have flipped to more positive among the world’s reserve managers: 67.9% said it is a more attractive currency, and 24.7% expect their euro investments to increase.
• There has been a slight move towards artificial intelligence use among reserve managers at the central banks: 17.5% are using the technology, up from 11.4% last year. Over one-third are considering using AI.
• Reserve managers were split on whether slow adoption of AI could put reserve managers at a disadvantage, although 53.8% of 91 respondents disagreed. Among proponents, AI is considered essential for market intelligence, algorithmic trading and liquidity forecasting, where timely and data-driven insights are increasingly valuable.
• Slightly more central banks said they incorporate sustainable investing into reserve management: 52.6%, up from 44.9% in 2025. The biggest challenge that central banks face remains integration with the central bank mandate.

Profile of respondents

The survey questionnaire was sent to 159 central banks in January 2026. By March, 101 central banks had sent their feedback. These institutions jointly manage over $9.5 trillion of global reserves. The average reserve holding was $94.2 billion. Breakdowns of the respondents by geography, economic development and reserve holding can be found in the tables below. The term ‘eurozone’ refers to the group of 21 central banks whose national currency is the euro, as well as the European Central Bank (ECB). The term ‘Europe’ refers to all other central banks in the region.¹

Geopolitical risks are once again at the forefront of central bank reserve managers’ minds, and are now more severe. Of the 99 respondents to this question, a clear majority – 69 (69.7%) – voted it their most pressing concern. This is significantly higher than when geopolitical escalation was seen as the top risk in 2024 by 35.6% of 87 reserve managers, as the war in Gaza threatened to destabilise the Middle East and Red Sea supply chains.

The US and Israel launched airstrikes on Iran on February 28, 2026, and Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz by March 2. The last response to the survey came on March 6. “Ongoing and emerging geopolitical conflicts are a major risk because they influence trade, capital flows, commodity prices and financial market correlations,” said the reserve manager of a central bank in the Middle East.

Last year, 19.1% of 89 reserve managers voted geopolitical escalation as the second most important threat. Global monetary policy and interest rates were ranked the second-highest concern among reserve managers this year (19, or 19.2%). The challenge for reserve managers is that geopolitical escalation has erupted against an already uncertain economic landscape. In comments, reserve managers stressed that geopolitical, monetary policy and interest rate risks are not isolated, but interact and compound. The risk of an energy shock turning into inflation shock and possible shifts in major central banks’ monetary policies would “directly impact yields, FX flows and reserve valuations”, said a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa.

Volatile inflation and unsustainable fiscal deficits were respectively the third and fourth most concerning risks, although debt overtook inflation when votes for first and second ranks were added. Very few reserve managers voted a credit event (2, or 2.0%) or elevated asset prices (1, or 1.0%) as their top concern, and none identified depressed global growth as a primary threat. When votes for the top two and three ranks were added together, elevated asset prices overtook credit as the more imminent risk.

Inflation and interest rates remained the most important factors expected to affect reserve management over the next five years. Of 98 respondents to this question, 51 (52.0%) ranked it highest, down from 76.4% of 89 respondents last year.

A reserve manager from a high income central bank in the Americas said interest rate trajectories are the most important factor for its reserve management team as “portfolio composition is expected to remain centred on debt instruments”. Others said divergent inflation and interest rate trajectories across major economies are key drivers of portfolio allocation decisions across currencies and along the yield curve. Interest rate dynamics are expected to shape duration, valuation risk and income generation.

In yet another sign that geopolitical risks are now more severe, a higher share of reserve managers voted geopolitics their most significant risk in the medium term – 29 (or 29.6%), up from 14.6% of 89 respondents in 2025 – citing rising geopolitical fragmentation, sanctions risk and geoeconomic competition. It remains the second-highest-rated factor, and has an impact on inflation and interest rates.

“Over the next five years, global FX reserves managers will rigorously assess whether the US dollar’s role as the dominant global reserve currency continues, amid rising global fragmentation,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in the Asia-Pacific region.

In third place is the role of the US dollar. A higher share of reserve managers than last year identified the role of the US dollar as the most significant factor expected to affect their reserve management over the next five years (16, or 16.3%, up from 3.4%). More reserve managers identified the role of the US dollar as a key factor this year than for geopolitics last year. Closely related is the Fed’s independence, policy and market credibility, and monetary and financial stability. Exchange rate dynamics also have consequences for other central banks’ reserve value and their countries’ trade balances.

“We believe the independence of the US Federal Reserve will affect term premiums,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in the Middle East.

“Confidence in US monetary policy, particularly the independence of the Federal Reserve, will remain critical for global market stability,” stated a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa.

A reserve manager from another central bank in Africa agreed: “Any sustained perception of reduced monetary policy autonomy could weaken confidence in a reserve currency by undermining its credibility as a store of value, potentially leading to higher inflation risk premia and greater volatility along the yield curve.”

The US bond market has suffered a significant markdown in investor confidence among central bank reserve managers year on year. This year, 28 out of 85 respondents (32.9%) think US bonds will outperform other Group of Seven economies and China, down from 54.3% of 81 respondents in 2025 and 71.1% out of 76 respondents in 2024. Nevertheless, it remains in prime position. Over half of respondents to this question said it will be the top or second-best-performing market (44, or 51.8%).

A reserve manager in the Asia-Pacific region said: “The US bond market outperforms not just because of yields and Fed policy, but because the underlying economy is stronger, more resilient and more trusted than most peers’. That economic foundation ensures global investors continue to support Treasuries as the benchmark safe‑haven asset.”

Confidence in the UK bond market continues to rebound slightly after instability in the gilt market in 2022, with 17.6% of 85 reserve managers stating they think it will outperform the other major economies this year, up from 10.0% out of 80 respondents last year and just 3.9% of 76 respondents in 2024. However, while fiscal concerns have lowered, reserve managers expressed that these may re-emerge if political uncertainties persist.

Likewise, more reserve managers this year believe Chinese bonds will outperform G7 economies – 11.9% of 84 respondents, up from 5.0% of 80 respondents in 2025 – putting it on an equal footing with Australia. Views remain mixed, however. While a reserve manager in the Asia-Pacific region said China’s co-ordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus, alongside easing trade tensions, supports a sustained economic recovery and continued appreciation of the CNY, a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa countered that the People’s Bank of China’s accommodative stance supports liquidity, but “structural growth challenges and FX considerations may weigh on relative returns”.

Investor confidence in Australia remains relatively stable, rising slightly from around 10% of reserve managers believing it will outperform the other bond markets in 2024 and 2025, to 11.9% this year. Adding together first and second place rankings puts the UK second after the US, Germany third, China fourth, Australia fifth, Canada sixth and France seventh. Last year, China ranked below France.

Japan remains most likely to be ranked last, with 31 (or 36.9%) out of 84 respondents expecting it to perform poorly relative to peers, although this year more reserve managers expect Japan to outperform France when first and second rankings are added together. France facing a possible credit rating downgrade due to persistent fiscal challenges may lead to wider OAT-Bund spread. However, a view from Europe was that “Japan and China present more policy and structural uncertainty, which makes them comparatively less attractive for conservative reserve allocations”.

The share of central banks that incorporate geopolitical risks into their reserve management and asset-allocation decision-making is level with last year, after rising from 2024. Of 96 respondents to the question, 73 central banks (76.0%) said they incorporate geopolitical risk into their risk management and asset-allocation decision-making. In 2025, 75.9% of 87 respondents said they did, up from 67.0% of 88 respondents in 2024.

By geography, this year, a higher share of central banks in the Americas said they now incorporate geopolitical risks into their reserve management and asset-allocation decision-making (14, or 66.7%), up from 54.5% of 22 respondents last year.

In light of geopolitical risk, “deeper research on counterparties, further diversification of investment infrastructure and avoidance of transactions that at some point could be reached by sanctions are among measures that can be carefully implemented by reserve managers,” stated an official from a central bank in the Americas.

“Over the past 12 months, adjustments have primarily focused on currency exposure and asset-class allocation to mitigate potential market volatility arising from geopolitical developments,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa.

A majority of central banks that incorporate geopolitical risks into their reserve management and asset allocation made changes in the last 12 months: 57 out of 69 (82.6%), up from 72.6% of 62 respondents last year, and 53.6% out of 56 in 2024. A significantly higher proportion of respondents considered changes (50, or 72.5%), up from 56.5% out of 62 respondents in 2025.

Globally, the most common changes continued to be to issuers (28, or 40.6%) and counterparties (24, or 34.8%). However, a higher share of central banks made changes to their gold allocation (22, or 31.9%) than in 2025 (26.8% out of 56 respondents). This is in line with the finding last year that reserve managers were most likely to be considering making changes to their gold allocation (28.6% out of 62 respondents). This year, slightly more central banks made changes to the asset classes they invest in (19, or 27.5%) than the currencies they invest in (18, or 26.1%).

More central banks changed their custodians (9, or 13.0%) than last year (9.6% out of 52 respondents). This year, reserve managers were also asked about the location of assets: 10 central banks reported making changes (14.5%), and this was the change other central banks were most likely to be considering (23, or 33.3%).

By geography, last year’s prediction that 2026 may see changes in gold allocation among central banks in Africa came true, with many buying locally. In 2025, 3 central banks in Africa had made changes and 7 had considered changing their allocation to gold. This year, 7 central banks made changes and 5 considered making changes to their gold allocation. The results this year suggest that central banks in Africa will also be the most likely to change the location of their assets, asset classes and currencies they invest in over the next 12 months.

In another new question this year, the majority of 100 respondents (83, or 83.0%) said they use active management strategies with the objective of outperforming their benchmark.

Popular strategies used are yield-curve positioning (70, or 84.3%) and duration management (69, or 83.1%). Credit spread positioning (61, or 73.5%) and relative value trading (53, or 63.9%) are also widely deployed. Around a half of respondents apply asset-class weightings (44, or 53.0%) and around one-third use FX positioning (26, or 31.3%). Over half use strategies via external managers (48, or 57.8%). Just 2 central banks (2.4%) said they employ other methods: these were calendar spread strategies, and repo specials and cross-currency basis swaps. Eighty-three central banks addressed this question.

Some reserve managers gave further details about their strategies. A eurozone reserve manager said the central bank uses two active layers over the strategic benchmark. The first is voted on by the investment committee, has a longer-term view of at least a quarter and has a slightly bigger risk budget for equities. “The other active layer is active positions by individual portfolio managers, who can take active positions with a relatively small risk budget in duration, curve, currencies and credit,” they said.

Of 95 respondents, 36 (37.9%) of reserve managers said they use a form of hedging to manage their FX exposure, usually either fully or partially hedging to their numeraire (9, or 9.5%), or to a select number of currencies (8, or 8.4%). The vast majority, however, do not use hedging to manage their FX exposure (59, or 62.1%).

Most central banks, if they do hedge, use FX swaps and forwards (28, or 77.8%). Around one-fifth (8, or 22.2%) use FX futures or cross-currency swaps, and half that number use FX options (4, or 11.1%). Thirty-six reserve managers addressed this question.

“Hedging against one of the major currencies would de facto be an alternative to the adjustment of the currency composition of foreign reserves,” a reserve manager in Europe said.

Similarly to last year, just over half of 93 respondents said they see their FX and gold reserves increasing in 2026 (48, 51.6%).

International reserves can be essential for effective monetary policy and financial stability. Maintaining investor confidence in the country remained the primary reason for increasing FX reserves and gold. Of 48 respondents to this question, two-thirds (32, or 66.7%) said it is a key objective, up slightly from 60.9% of 46 respondents last year.

Notably, servicing external obligations has become more of a priority. Twenty-seven central banks (56.3%) cited this as a reason for increasing their FX reserves and gold, up from 41.3% of 46 respondents in 2025. Greater liquidity needs in uncertain markets (26, or 54.2%) also overtook FX interventions (23, or 47.9%) as a primary driver, again becoming a higher priority than in 2025 (39.1%). Around half of central banks identified a buffer for FX interventions as a goal (23, or 47.9%), but down from 58.7% last year.

A reserve manager of a central bank in Africa said: “The need to maintain investor confidence and be prepared for currency interventions are some of the reasons why countries like ours are likely to increase their FX reserves”.

Other reasons included diversification due to inflation concerns and price changes against the US dollar.

Similarly to last year, many central banks plan to increase their FX reserves via capital inflows (29, or 60.4%) and purchases with local currency (18, or 37.5%). A higher proportion of respondents plan to increase their reserves via purchases of locally mined gold than in 2025: 16, or 33.3%, up from 21.7% out of 46 respondents in 2025. The number of central banks that plan to increase their reserves by swap agreements remained level (9, or 18.8%), while the share that plan to increase their reserves via an injection of government funds decreased from 26.1% to 16.7%. In contrast, more central banks (8, 16.7%) plan to finance the increase of their reserves through issuance than in 2025 (8.7%). Other methods include reallocation between asset classes and currencies.

Of 94 central banks, 47 (50.0%) intervened in FX markets in the last 12 months. Half of 84 respondents also reported intervening in FX markets last year. Central banks often do not publicly announce FX interventions – rendering them both at once an incredibly important and underreported tool.

Removing eurozone central banks from analysis, the proportion of central banks that intervened in FX markets in the last 12 months rises to 47 out of 80 central banks (58.8%). This result supports the finding last year that close to half of central banks intended to increase their FX reserves for possible FX interventions in 2026.

By region, central banks in the Asia-Pacific (12, or 75.0%) were most likely to have intervened in FX markets, followed by central banks in Africa (15, 68.2%) and the Middle East (4, or 66.7%). Nonetheless, around 40–50% of central banks in Europe and the Americas also reported conducting FX interventions.

A reserve manager of a central bank in the Asia-Pacific region said the institution intervened to limit currency volatility.

Echoing this, “where there is volatility in the FX market, we intervene, both ways, to restore stability and assure confidence [for] market players and investors”, a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa said.

“Operations were aimed at smoothing short-term imbalances in supply and demand, and supporting orderly market functioning, without targeting a specific exchange rate level,” stated a reserve manager in the Americas.

Central banks with reserves between $26 billion and $50 billion were most likely to have intervened in the last 12 months (7, or 77.8%), followed by smaller central banks with between $11 billion and $25 billion (5, or 71.4%), or less than $1 billion (5, or 62.5%). Nonetheless, even among central banks with some of the largest reserves in the world, 58.3% (7) of respondents with over $100 billion in reserves intervened. Last year, central banks with reserves between $11 billion and $25 billion were most likely to have intervened in the last 12 months (83.3% of respondents in that reserve bracket) and 50% of central banks with assets in excess of $100 billion had reported stepping into FX markets.

More central banks that intervened in FX markets bought and sold local currency (34, or 72.3%) than last year (25, or 61.0%, of 41 respondents). Forty-seven central banks provided responses this year. Central banks were more likely to buy (10, or 21.3%) than sell (3, or 6.4%) local currency.

More reserve managers expect the pace of diversification globally to accelerate this year (67 out of 97 respondents, or 69.1%) than in 2025 (50.6% out of 87 respondents). Fewer respondents this year expect the pace of diversification to remain stable (25, or 25.8%) or slow down (4, or 4.1%). Once again, just 1 respondent (1.0%) expects the pace of diversification to reverse.

“Over the next year, reserve managers are likely to accelerate diversification, but in a measured and cautious way, rather than through aggressive shifts,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in Europe. Many reserve managers pointed to geopolitical tensions being a key driver.

“The pace of diversification will accelerate because reserve managers now see political risk as systemic, not just cyclical,” commented a reserve manager of a central bank in the Asia-Pacific region. “The dollar remains dominant, but the strategic shift is towards multi‑currency, multi‑asset portfolios that can withstand shocks from geopolitics, sanctions and monetary divergence.”

A reserve manager of a central bank in Africa said they expect accelerated diversification to be “driven by heightened geopolitical fragmentation”. “These developments are prompting a reassessment of concentration risks and a greater focus on portfolio resilience.” They agreed that “diversification is likely to be incremental, rather than abrupt”: “Nonetheless, the trend is clear: allocations are expected to expand towards gold and non-traditional reserve currencies.”

“A more polarised world may see more diversification away from USD, especially if compounded by concerns about Fed independence,” stated a eurozone official.

“Amid increasing geopolitical tensions and elevated uncertainty, diversification across asset classes, regions and sectors is a time-proven strategy to reduce portfolio volatility,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas. “Trump volatility could also mean opportunities for active management.”

Another official in the Americas region said they expect the accelerated diversification trend to continue, “given volatile and novel policy shifts by the US administration in addition to elevated levels of geopolitical tension”.

As well as geopolitical risks and tariffs, reserve managers said they are monitoring the mid-term elections coming up in the US and Fed chair post.

Over the last 12 months, central banks were most likely to increase their duration (39, or 41.5%), and increase their liquidity (38, or 41.8%). Ninety-four central banks responded to this question.

As uncertainty around the war in Iran plays out, some central banks that increased duration may need to restrategise. “On the duration front, reflecting views that inflation had peaked and expectations of potential Fed rate cuts, we substantially extended portfolio duration, focusing on the US Treasury curve,” said a reserve manager of the central bank in Africa.

Slightly more central banks increased their asset-class diversification (36, or 38.7%) than last year (31.4% out of 86 respondents). Around one-third of central banks increased their exposure to gold (30, or 32.3%), up from 21.4%. The share of central banks increasing their currency diversification remained fairly level year on year: 22, or 23.9% – up slightly from 20.0%.

Challenges that reserve managers face include declining export revenues and heightened investment risks arising from trade tensions, geopolitical developments and fiscal pressures.

“As we increase medium- to long-term investments, we must ensure sufficient funds remain in our call accounts to meet any unexpected payment obligations,” stated a reserve manager in the Asia-Pacific region.

“Portfolio adjustments focused on preserving liquidity and enhancing resilience,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas. “Diversification will depend on the monetary policy of each country and on the evolution of macroeconomic indicators,” another official in the region stated.

Over the next 12 months, over half of 93 central banks said they expect to prioritise asset diversification (50, or 53.8%), and over one-third expect to increase their exposure to gold (35, or 38.5%) and different currencies (34, or 37.4%). Around one-third said they anticipate increasing their duration, liquidity and credit exposure respectively.

Last year, around half of respondents anticipated increasing their diversification, suggesting there could in practice be challenges around doing so, now further compounded by increasing uncertainty.

“We are currently reviewing our long-term SAA, taking into account the latest capital market assumptions and evolving macroeconomic conditions,” said an official in Africa. “Over the next 12 months, portfolio positioning is expected to be tactical, rather than strategic, focusing on near-term opportunities and risk management.”

Liquidity becomes the most important objective for foreign reserves in times of acute stress. To manage this, most central banks use Treasury bills (84, or 83.2%), deposits with official institutions (81, or 80.2%) and deposits with commercial banks (76, or 75.2%). A hundred and one central banks addressed this question. Many central banks use money market deposits (58, or 57.4%) and around half use repo transactions (47, or 46.5%). Around one-third use commercial paper or certificates of deposit (35, or 34.7%), and FX swaps (33, or 32.7%). Relatively few central banks use money market funds to manage their liquidity (16, or 15.8%).

Beyond the core reserve currencies, including the US dollar, euro, sterling and yen, a group of mid-sized western economies, or allies of the West, continue to receive investments from a wide set of central banks. Chief among them is the Australian dollar, which 46.7% of central banks (43 out of 92 respondents) reported investing in, parallel to last year (45.8% out of 83 respondents). Slightly more central banks also reported allocating more than 15% of their reserves (4, or 10.8%) to the Australian dollar than last year, when just a single central bank did so.

The share of reserve managers investing in renminbi both onshore (41, or 45.1%) and offshore (29, or 32.2%) has remained relatively stable. Last year, 43.4% out of 83 respondents said they were investing onshore, and 36.1% said they were investing in the renminbi offshore. In 2025, onshore renminbi investments emerged as the most attractive option being considered among central banks.

This year, both onshore (8, 8.8%) and offshore renminbi investments did (8, or 8.9%). Percentages differ slightly because 91 central banks gave insights into their intended onshore Chinese renminbi investments, and 90 did so for offshore.

Behind the Australian dollar and onshore renminbi investments, the next most popular currency that reserve managers are currently investing in is the Canadian dollar (37 out of 92 central banks, or 40.2%), although no central bank reported allocating over 15% of its reserves to it.

The Canadian dollar emerged as the most attractive currency being considered by reserve managers for investment in 5–10 years’ time (17, or 18.5%), followed by the Australian dollar (11, or 12.0%), the New Zealand dollar (10, or 11.2%) and South Korean won (10, or 11.2%).

While 9 central banks reported investing in the South African rand (10.2%), in terms of the other original five Brics member states, fewer than five central banks reported investing in either the Brazilian real (3, or 3.4%) or Indian rupee (4, or 4.5%). While 10 central banks said they are considering, or would consider, investing in the Indian rupee at some point, no other respondents expressed an interest in investing in the South African rand. Three central banks are currently investing in the Brazilian real, and 4 others said they would consider investing in 5–10 years.

Similarly, 4 central banks are currently investing in the Saudi riyal, and a further 5 said they would consider investing in the next 5–10 years. Saudi Arabia’s membership of the Brics bloc remains ambiguous.

Supranationals (91, or 94.8%), government bonds with an above-BBB credit rating (87, or 90.6%) continue to lead on asset classes that central banks invest in. Just 8 out of 90 respondents (8.9%) said they are investing in government bonds with a rating below BBB, with 75 central banks (83.3%) saying they have no interest in investing in them.

The vast majority of central banks also invest in deposits with central banks and the official sector (85, or 88.5%), Treasury bills (84, or 87.5%) and deposits with commercial banks (77, or 81.1%). Close to three-quarters of central banks invest in gold (69, or 72.6%), up slightly from 69.4% (59 out 85 respondents) last year. Fifteen central banks said they are considering investing in gold now (15.8%), and 3 (or 3.2%) said they would consider investing in 5–10 years’ time, with just 8 (8.4%) saying they have no interest in investing. Just over half of 54 respondents that gave the share of their gold allocation said over 10% of their reserves are invested in gold (51.9%), up from 43.4% of 46 respondents in 2025. Similarly, more central banks (20.4%) said over 25% of their reserves are invested in gold, up from 13.0% last year, revealing a shift towards the upper bound as central banks purchased gold and the price rose.

Just 2 (2.2%) out of 89 central banks reported investing in silver, with 3 (3.4%) considering investing now and 4 (4.5%) considering investing in 5–10 years. The vast majority of central banks, however, reported having no interest in investing in silver (80, or 89.9%).

Investment in US agency bonds has remained relatively stable, with 62.0% (57 out of 92 central banks) reporting investing in them this year. Last year, there appeared to be a shift out of US agency bonds when 48 out of 82 respondents (58.5%) said they were investing in the asset class compared with 59 out of 84 respondents (70.2%) in 2024.

Around half of central banks reported investing in investment-grade corporate bonds (50, or 56.2%) and covered bonds (46, or 49.5%).

This year, the share of central banks that said they are investing in inflation-linked bonds – 42 out of 90 respondents, or 46.7% – remained about level with 2025 (41 out of 83, or 49.4%), despite 11 (13.3%) central banks saying they were considering making an investment last year. This year, a similar proportion said they are considering investing in inflation-linked bonds in 2026 (13 out of 90 respondents, or 14.4%).

Around one-third of respondents said they invest in asset backed- and mortgaged-backed securities (29 out of 90 respondents, or 32.2%).

In terms of equities, this year, reserve managers were asked about their investments in developed and emerging markets. Twenty-two out of 90 respondents (24.4%) said they are investing in developed markets, but just 7 out of 87 respondents (8.0%) said they are investing in emerging markets.

Meanwhile, investment in green bonds appears to be growing. While the share of reserve managers that said they are investing in green bonds was fairly level – 62 out of 94 respondents (66.0%) said they are investing in green bonds now, compared with 62.1% last year – the proportion of reserves allocated to these assets tended to be 1–3% (46.2% of 52 respondents) and below 1% (38.5%). Allocation to social and sustainability bonds remained incredibly low, tending to be below 1% (22, or 51.2%).

In terms of stablecoins and cryptocurrencies, no central banks reported having made any investments, although 6 central banks out of 86 respondents (7.0%) reported considering investing in stablecoins in 5–10 years’ time, and 4 out of 88 central banks (4.5%) said they would considering investing in other cryptocurrencies in that period, compared with 2 saying the same for each asset class last year, signifying a possible small shift sentiment at a minority of institutions.

Although no reserve managers said they are investing in stablecoins or cryptocurrencies, 26 of 97 respondents (26.8%) said they think digital currencies are becoming more credible as an asset class.

Among the 26 central banks that consider that digital currencies are becoming more credible, asked which ones, most (23, or 88.5%) pointed to CBDCs. Digital simply “means another form of infrastructure”, a reserve manager of a central bank in Europe said. More than half of respondents said stablecoins are becoming more credible (16, or 61.5%) and over one-quarter said bitcoin (7, or 26.9%).

“Stablecoins are becoming a possible alternative investment, given the passage of [the] Genius Act, which requires stablecoins to be backed by US government-issued securities,” said a reserve manager of the central bank in the Asia-Pacific region.

Of 85 respondents, just 2 (2.4%) central banks said digitally issued bonds are currently an approved asset class for investment in reserves, with 2 more considering them. Four central banks (4.7%) said CBDC is under consideration for approval as an asset class.

Similarly to 2025, out of 88 respondents, most central banks are against a strategic bitcoin reserve fund (47, or 53.4%), a significant number (40, or 45.5%) are unsure. This is a sign of a small shift towards uncertainty, rather than outright rejection. Last year, 59.5% of 84 respondents were against, and 39.3% were unsure.

On the whole, reserve managers were clear about current limitations of bitcoin and other cryptocurrency as a reserve asset – including reputational risks due to their association with evading sanctions and conducting illegal operations – but said the possibility of investing in the future depends on how regulation and the market develop.

“Cryptocurrencies still do not meet the basic requirements for reserve assets – trading volume as well as liquidity is insufficient. The high volatility and unpredictability of value as well as the risk of speculation and price manipulation limit their role as [a] store of wealth,” said a reserve manager in Europe. “Furthermore, operational risk related to hacker attacks, fraud and technological failures should not be neglected. The cryptocurrency market is fragmented, storage methods are insufficient, legal regulations are inconsistent.”

“At this stage, strategic bitcoin reserve fund proposals remain unsuitable for reserve portfolios,” stated a reserve manager in Africa. “While such proposals may generate interest as a potential diversification tool, concerns around high volatility, regulatory uncertainty, limited liquidity and long-term store-of-value characteristics make it difficult to assess their appropriateness for central bank reserves. Careful monitoring of market developments and regulatory frameworks would be required before considering any allocation.”

“Bitcoin cannot be a reserve asset in the traditional sense because it lacks the stability, yield and institutional frameworks that make Treasuries, gold or major currencies reliable. At best, it can serve as a speculative hedge or symbolic diversification tool – but not the backbone of sovereign reserves,” said a reserve manager in the Asia-Pacific region.

“Crypto assets are currently unsuitable for central bank portfolios due to their high volatility, limited liquidity, regulatory uncertainty, and elevated operational and fraud risks. They do not yet meet the requirements of safety, stability or broad acceptance as stores of value or means of exchange,” said a reserve manager in the Americas.

Reserve managers also expressed concerns regarding weakened control over monetary policy and threats to financial stability.

Year on year, the small group of reserve managers that think de-dollarisation is not increasing is getting smaller, and the group of those who think it will accelerate is getting a little bigger. Ninety-seven central banks addressed this question.

Slightly more reserve managers think that de-dollarisation will accelerate (9, or 9.3%) than in 2025 (4, or 4.6%) and in 2024 (2, or 2.4%). Fewer also think de-dollarisation is not increasing (11, or 11.3%), than in 2025 (15, or 17.2%) and 2024 (19, or 22.4%). The vast majority continue to hold that de-dollarisation is occurring, but on a gradual basis (76, or 78.4%), level with last year (67, or 77.0%).

Of 95 reserve managers, most said they either strongly agree (22, or 23.2%) or agree (54, or 56.8%) that the US dollar is still the safe-haven currency. A sizeable minority were neutral (15, or 15.8%) and 4 (4.2%) disagreed. No reserve managers strongly disagreed.

The “diminishing faith” of investors in US policies has affected the US dollar, one reserve manager in Europe said.

“Persistently high fiscal deficits and sovereign credit rating downgrades have somewhat weakened the perception of the United States as a safe-haven asset,” stated a reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas. “Given geopolitical and credit-quality issues, it is losing its strength,” said another reserve manager from the region.

A reserve manager of a central bank in the Asia-Pacific region said: “Rising US debt levels, trade policies and de-dollarisation concerns prompt some of the investors to cautiously consider alternatives. Therefore, while the dollar is generally seen as safe, it is not entirely immune to challenges, which is why ‘2 – Agree’ can reflect a slightly less absolute view.”

A third reserve manager from the Americas countered: “So far, de-dollarisation can be seen mostly as reflecting an increase in international trade involving relevant non-USD economies”.

However, geopolitical tensions and geopolitical fragmentation may accelerate the pace of de-dollarisation.

Geopolitical tension fuels de-dollarisation and currency diversification, “mainly among developing economies”, strengthening the role of major regional currencies, another reserve manager of a European central bank said.

However, in their view, the role of the US dollar is supported by a strong economy, developed payment system, mature financial markets and stable financial system: “It would be really hard for other financial markets to offer a comparable level of development over the next couple of years.”

“Recent diversification efforts by reserve managers are primarily driven by geopolitical fragmentation, heightened sanctions risk and the need to enhance portfolio resilience, rather than by a fundamental loss of confidence in USD assets,” said a reserve manager in Africa. In their view, “de‑dollarisation of global FX reserves is increasing, but … the process remains gradual and incremental, rather than structural or disruptive”.

Other reserve managers pointed to the structural advantages the US dollar continues to enjoy, and to its central position in global trade, financing and payment systems, which protect its status as the global safe-haven currency.

A reserve manager from a central bank in the Americas said: “Despite gradual diversification trends, the US dollar remains the primary safe-haven currency due to its depth, liquidity and central role in global trade and financial markets.”

“In practice, liquidity constraints, market depth and operational considerations continue to limit both the pace and the scale of diversification away from the dollar,” said the reserve manager from Africa. “Importantly, there is currently no credible alternative that matches the dollar across these dimensions, reinforcing its continued primacy in the international monetary system.”

Further, reserve managers expressed the view that, at the moment, there is no alternative during times of stress.

“In periods of stress, investors still prioritise the ability to move large sums instantly without market disruption – something no alternative matches,” commented another reserve manager of a central bank in Europe.

“The US dollar remains the primary safe-haven currency due to its unmatched liquidity, depth of markets and role in global trade and finance,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas. “While structural and fiscal considerations warrant monitoring, these have not materially undermined its safe-haven function in periods of stress.”

However, a reserve manager in Europe said that, while they do not expect to see a “sharp shift” away from the dollar, “there appears to be a move to diversify reserves away from a large reliance on the US dollar, mainly as a way to spread risk and strengthen resilience”. While they said the dollar is “still a vehicle currency, reserve managers increasingly see safety during stress as coming from a mix of assets, not just one currency”.

“The US dollar remains the primary safe-haven currency, given its global liquidity, stability and the depth of US financial markets,” stated a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa. “However, other assets like gold and certain sovereign bonds are increasingly considered as alternative safe havens during periods of global uncertainty.”

The safe-haven status is, however, dependent on confidence in US institutions and the credibility of the Federal Reserve. “There is too much political uncertainty in the US for the dollar to be really safe while Trump is in office,” a eurozone official said.

There is no viable alternative or substitute “yet”, a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa noted.

Of 95 central banks, 42.1% made changes to the composition of their USD portfolio in the last 12 months.

Of the 40 central banks that changed the composition of their USD portfolio, net 13 (32.5%) increased their exposure to US Treasuries, and 11 to sovereign, supranational and agency bonds (27.5%). Corporate bonds (6, 15.0%), mortgage- and asset-backed securities (5, or 12.5%) and equities (5, or 12.5%) also saw more central banks invest than divest overall. Likewise, inflation-linked bonds (3, or 7.5%) and ‘other assets’ saw a modest net increase in the number of central banks investing in them (3, or 7.5%).

Thirty-eight central banks addressed this question. Exposure to US issuers among the central banks that changed the composition of their US portfolio increased at 18 institutions (47.4%), but decreased at 10 (26.3%), and 10 (26.3%) said their exposure stayed the same.

Of 92 respondents to this question, 25 (27.2%) central banks are considering increasing their exposure to the dollar over the next 12 months, 11 (12.0%) are considering decreasing it. Thirty-six central banks (39.2%) indicated they are considering changes to the composition of their USD portfolio overall.

Nine central banks in the Americas, 5 central banks in Europe, 4 in the Asia-Pacific region, 2 in the Middle East and 1 in the eurozone were planning to increase their dollar investments. Four central banks in the Americas, 3 in Africa, 3 in the Asia-Pacific region and 1 in the eurozone were planning to decrease their dollar investments.

Central banks that said they are considering changes to the composition of their USD portfolio tend to be planning to increase their exposure to US Treasuries (16, or 44.4%), although a fair share plan to decrease their exposure to what has historically been considered the premier safe-haven asset (11, or 30.6%). Notably, 9 central banks (25.0%) reported intending to move into corporate bonds.

If central banks act on these changes, their exposure to US issuers is expected to increase (14, or 43.8%) more often than not (8, or 25.0%). Thirty-two central banks addressed this question.

A key tenor of US policy is that stablecoins will drive demand for US Treasuries, thereby supporting the position of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. However, central banks on the whole question this assumption, with much depending on developing stablecoin credibility. Of 90 respondents to this question, 49 (54.4%) said they are not sure and 27 (30.0%) disagreed. Just 14 (15.6%) said they agree.

“Stablecoins extend and modernise the dollar’s dominance by embedding it into digital finance, making it more accessible globally. However, their long‑term role as reserve assets depends on regulation, credibility and competition from CBDCs,” stated a reserve manager of a central bank in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, “if properly regulated, they could strengthen the USD’s reserve currency status, rather than weaken it”, they added.

“USD-linked stablecoins may reinforce the dollar’s use in payments and cross-border transactions, but they [are not a] substitute for the institutional, legal and market foundations that underpin the USD’s role as a reserve currency,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas.

“Stablecoins have the potential to support and reinforce the role of the USD as a reserve currency, primarily by extending its use in digital payments, settlements and cross‑border transactions, rather than by transforming reserve portfolios themselves,” agreed a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa. “USD‑pegged stablecoins effectively digitise dollar liquidity, increasing the currency’s reach and convenience, particularly in jurisdictions with weaker domestic payment systems or restricted access to traditional dollar funding.” This depends, however, on the “transparency of reserves, sound governance and reliable convertibility into fiat dollars”.

“Stablecoins will complement the USD’s reserve role by extending how and where the dollar is used,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas. “By enabling near-instant and low-cost cross-border payments and settlement, stablecoins will increase the transactional demand for the dollar. Furthermore, it will create additional demand for safe USD assets, as stablecoins, by design, are pegged to an asset, whether fiat, commodity or crypto. In this instance, fiat-backed stablecoins will increase the demand for US Treasuries or cash equivalents, thereby indirectly supporting demand for US government debt.”

“Stablecoins could entrench USD usage globally at the margin, especially in payments and financial plumbing – but they complement, rather than fundamentally transform, the dollar’s reserve currency status,” commented a reserve manager of a central bank in Europe.

Central banks are broadly split on whether the renminbi has become a more or less attractive currency. Of 69 respondents to this question, 36 (52.2%) said it has become a more attractive currency, and 33 (47.8%) said it has become a less attractive currency.

Similar to last year, most reserve managers think that the renminbi’s share of global reserves will continue to rise throughout the decade.

Respondents for the most part expect renminbi reserves to remain between 1–3% by the end of this year (56, or 75.7%). This fell dramatically to 20.5% of respondents expecting renminbi in global reserves to remain at this level by 2030, and down to just 8.2% by 2035. Of 73 respondents to this question, 91.8% expect the share of renminbi in global reserves to be 4% or higher by 2035.

“The renminbi has made some progress as an international currency, but its relevance continues to be limited, and not proportional to the size and weight of the Chinese economy,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas.

“The renminbi’s share in global reserves is expected to rise gradually, constrained by capital controls, market liquidity and transparency considerations, despite its growing role in trade settlement,” commented another official from the region.

“The renminbi’s share of global reserves is expected to increase gradually, supported by China’s role in global trade, broader use of the currency in bilateral settlement arrangements and targeted diversification efforts by some reserve managers,” said a reserve manager in Africa. “However, progress is likely to remain incremental, rather than transformational.”

Similarly, a reserve manager of a central bank in Europe stated: “The renminbi’s share of global reserves is expected to rise gradually as central banks continue to diversify and China deepens its financial markets. However, capital controls, limited market liquidity and governance concerns are likely to constrain the pace of increase – implying steady but incremental growth, rather than a rapid shift.” Increasing integration within the global financial system and further reforms aimed at increasing openness, transparency and liquidity of Chinese financial markets may aid investment. However, overall attractiveness is hit by geopolitical factors, regulatory barriers, structural issues and weakened economic growth prospects in China, said another official from the region.

While US tariffs may push countries to deepen trade ties with China, increasing the use of the renminbi and gradually boosting its role in global reserves, reserve managers also pointed to the lack of transparency of economic data in China being a negative factor and undermining its position as a reserve currency.

A reserve manager in Europe expressed the view that neither the renminbi nor the dollar “has grown to be a more reliable and stronger reserve asset”, to the possible benefit of other currencies. “Share of renminbi has been growing rather slowly in recent years”, even falling in recent periods, a eurozone official said, adding that they “expect this slow trend to continue due to geopolitical risks” and that “other currencies might see an increase in their shares, such as EUR, GBP, JPY, SEK, NOK”.

Asking reserve managers about their own investments in renminbi revealed a slightly different picture. Of 80 respondents to this question, just 46.3% expect to be investing more than 4% of their reserves in renminbi by 2035. A schism continues to exist in sentiment, with one-third of central banks saying they still expect to invest none of their reserves in the renminbi by 2035, although this is less than the 42.2% who say they will allocate nothing to renminbi in 2026.

Some reserve managers said they expect to increase their allocation over time due to increased trade with China and swaplines. Nevertheless, this is likely to be “gradual and measured”, as one reserve manager in Africa said. While acknowledging the increasing role of the renminbi in global trade and settlement, their focus is on “maintaining portfolio resilience and liquidity”. For this reason, “the renminbi is likely to remain a complementary, rather than core, reserve currency over the medium term”.

Views on the euro this year have flipped to more positive among the world’s reserve managers. Of 78 reserve managers at central banks who answered this question, 53 (67.9%) said it is a more attractive currency and 25 (32.1%) said it is a less attractive currency. In contrast, last year, 59.4% said it was a less attractive currency and 40.6% of 69 respondents said it was a more attractive currency. This still holds when eurozone and central banks in Europe are excluded from analysis, with 54.5% of 55 central banks viewing the euro as a more attractive currency this year.

Globally, of 80 respondents to the question, 66 central banks (82.5%) said they invest in the euro.

Excluding eurozone and central banks in Europe from analysis, 44 out of 56 respondents (78.6%) said they invest in the euro. These tend to invest less than 3% (18, or 32.1%), although a number reported investing 16–25% (8, or 14.3%) and 4–6% (6, or 10.7%).

While 63 out of 89 central banks globally (70.8%) said they expect to keep their euro investments level, 22 (24.7%) expect their euro investments to increase. Just 4 central banks (4.5%) said they are planning to decrease their investments to the euro.

Low rates and yield compared with the dollar continue to be the primary hurdle central banks identify to investing in the euro (54, or 58.1%), followed by weak growth prospects (33, or 35.5%). Ninety-three central banks addressed this question. Nevertheless, these issues appear to be of lesser concern, given that, last year, 73.1% of 67 respondents gave low rates and yields as a concern, and 53.7% cited weak growth prospects.

“The euro remains an important reserve currency, but its relative attractiveness is constrained by yield differentials, growth outlook and political uncertainty,” said a reserve manager in the Americas. “The Eurobond market is also fragmented, which complicates operations, as counterparties are typically needed for each individual country, given the differences in rules and market practices,” stated another official in the region. “Additionally, trading hours for euro-denominated products do not always overlap with the Americas, which can further complicate execution – particularly in scenarios where immediate liquidity is required.”

“Over the past year, while rhetoric around de-dollarisation initially suggested the euro might gain as a reserve currency, our view has become less positive,” said a reserve manager in Africa.

“Gold has emerged as a more prominent reserve asset, and the euro faces challenges that limit its appeal, including low yields relative to the dollar, weaker growth prospects and credit deterioration risks.” Furthermore, “divergent national interests within the EU create uncertainty about the long-term stability of the euro, and without deeper fiscal integration, more unified debt issuance and stronger geopolitical influence, it is unlikely to rival the US dollar as a core reserve currency”.

Reserve managers also pointed to limited reform momentum amid elevated debt and deficits alongside low growth heightening the risk of renewed debt pressures. “Structural productivity weakness weighs on growth prospects, while exposure to potential US tariffs and trade policy uncertainty clouds the outlook for exports and investment,” said a third reserve manager in the Americas.

A reserve manager in Europe said that, although the euro offers a developed payment system, mature financial markets and stable financial system “second only to the US market”, its role “could be further strengthened through stronger economic growth, reduction in structural problems and fiscal consolidation, decline in political uncertainty and measures to reduce financial market fragmentation”.

Among the central banks that invest in gold, most treat it as a separate asset class (44, or 66.7%) rather than include it in their strategic asset allocation (22, or 33.3%).

Of 66 respondents to this question, 25 (37.9%) central banks indicated that the record-high prices of gold are affecting reserve management decision-making.

The high price means some central banks are reassessing their allocation due to the share of reserves they are permitted to invest in gold as part of their investment policies. Indeed, a reserve manager in the Americas said that its “reserves are increasingly skewed to gold”, not through acquisition, but due to the increase in its price. “Despite not directly buying any gold, gold is now a greater portion of our reserves, and this has forced us to rethink our allocation,” stated a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa.

On the one hand, “gold has become increasingly attractive due to uncertainty in global financial markets”, according to a reserve manager of a central bank in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other, a second reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas said that the price volatility makes it difficult to include in their SAA, given low risk tolerance for loss over a short investment horizon. Another reserve manager in Africa said that gold “has become a more attractive asset to invest in”, but, because of high prices, “concentration risk is a challenge”.

A reserve manager in Europe, planning to initiate investment in gold this year, said that the “recent sharp increase” in gold prices is an important consideration from a timing and cost perspective, as it affects entry levels, but “the strategic rationale for holding gold as a diversification and safety asset remains unchanged”.

Around one-third of central banks with gold holdings are considering adding the precious metal (25, or 36.8%), and one-third considering more active management via deposits and swaps (25, or 36.8%). Sixty-eight central banks addressed this question. Some central banks are considering hedging strategies to protect its value (9, or 13.2%) and diversifying where gold is custodied (8, or 11.8%). Gold continues to serve as a store of value and portfolio-diversifier, but some central banks said they are considering hedging strategies and tactical adjustments to protect against market volatility. Another consideration is diversifying custody locations to reduce risk.

Of 61 respondents, 17 (27.9%) said the current price of gold is preventing the central bank from making further purchases.

Analysis included responses from all central banks, including those not currently investing in gold. Reserve managers expressed a range of views with regard to whether there will be a correction in gold markets. Of 60 respondents to this question, 18 – or 30.0% – said they expect the price to be just over or equal to $5,000 per ounce, while 19, or 31.7%, said they expect the price to be $6,000 per ounce or higher. The mean estimate was $5,354 per ounce and the median was $5,250.

Those that expect the price of gold to continue to rise cited ongoing geopolitical tensions, volatile inflation, shifts in monetary policy and continued demand for safe-haven assets amid subdued global growth and fiscal uncertainties.

Seven of 93 central banks (7.5%) are considering increasing the percentage of their reserves held in equities over the next 12 months, and 4 (4.3%) are considering investing for the first time. None reported planning to decrease their allocation.

Central banks planning to increase the weighting of equities in their reserve portfolio are most likely to be considering increasing their exposure to developed-market equities (7, or 30.4%), with US (5, or 22.7%) and European stocks (5, or 22.7%) proving equally attractive. Percentages differ slightly because some central banks did not make a selection for every category.

However, most are not planning to change their allocation. Decisions are guided by expected returns, risk-adjusted diversification benefits, and macroeconomic and geopolitical developments. Reserve managers explained that, while they offer high returns, equities also carry risks from market volatility and economic conditions, which also have a bearing on timing to increase equity exposure.

Nonetheless, the appeal for some reserve managers is the opportunity to hedge against government bonds. European equities were also said to offer structural exposure to industrial, financial and green investment themes, while emerging-market equities were said to benefit from long-term growth, demographics and policy support.

There has been a slight move towards AI use among reserve managers at the central banks. Of 97 respondents to this question, 17.5% are using the technology, up from 11.4% of 88 respondents last year. More are now considering using the technology – 35.1%, up from 28.4%.

Chief concerns among reserve managers reluctant to use AI are issues around data governance and privacy (28, or 71.8%). Although the technology promises to improve efficiency and productivity, resourcing and internal capacity (24, or 61.5%) are initially limiting factors to uptake.

Of the 17 central banks that answered this question, most said they are using AI for reporting (9, or 52.9%) and to improve staff efficiency (10, or 58.8%). Reporting was also the area most central banks said they are experimenting in (7, or 41.2%). Although last year, 3 out of 30 respondents (10.0%) reported using AI in tactical trading and execution, none of the 17 respondents did this year. However, 4 central banks (23.5%) reported using AI in their strategic asset allocation, up from none last year.

Reserve managers were split on whether slow adoption of AI could put reserve managers at a disadvantage, although a narrow majority of 91 respondents disagreed (49, or 53.8%).

Among proponents, AI is considered essential for market intelligence and algorithmic trading, risk monitoring, scenario analysis and predictive forecasting, as well as portfolio optimisation, where timely and data-driven insights are increasingly valuable.

Those who delay adoption may face slower reaction times, less efficient portfolio management and weaker competitive positioning, especially as markets become more data-driven. “If a reserve manager lags in AI adoption, it will identify macrofinancial risks later than its peers, potentially misreading global trends,” said one eurozone official.

“If central banks are not efficient vis-à-vis the rest of the market, there is a risk of losing comparative advantage in investment and trade execution,” stated a reserve manager of a central bank in Africa, particularly in complex, data-heavy environments.

However, reserve managers still expressed that careful implementation is important to avoid overreliance on models and ensure proper governance. Reserve managers have to think about what tasks can be confidently delegated to AI, taking care to minimise black-box risk. Other risks include false signals (hallucination) and misinterpretation of results.

There may also be institutional constraints, as central banks have to evaluate data governance, privacy and security considerations. “For reserve managers, institutional frameworks and risk discipline remain more critical than speed of adoption,” commented a reserve manager of a central bank in the Americas.

While some view AI as reducing the potential for errors, portfolio management and investment decisions must still depend on human judgement, experience and qualitative assessment, especially under uncertainty, a reserve manager of a central bank in Europe said: “Human capital therefore remains decisive, with AI acting as a complement, rather than a substitute.”

This year, the survey reveals a shift towards sustainable investing prioritisation. Just 10 of 98 respondents (10.2%) reported that it is not a priority, down from 23.6% of 89 respondents last year. Three central banks did, however, point to sustainable investing being deprioritised (3.1%). A similar share of respondents reported increasingly prioritising sustainable investing: 17.3%, compared with 18.0% in 2025.

Correspondingly, a slightly higher share of 97 respondents said their central bank incorporates sustainable investing into reserve management: 52.6%, up from 44.9% out of 89 central banks in 2025.

Sustainability-linked investments feature most prominently in central banks’ sustainable investing strategies (40, or 78.4%). Fifty-one central banks responded to this question – some reserve managers that indicated they invest in green bonds or social and sustainability bonds as an asset class did not participate in this question. A fair share also use environmental, social and governance (ESG) integration (22, or 43.1%) and negative screening (19, or 37.3%). Less common are climate-focused investments (12, or 23.5%) or best-in-class screening (12, or 23.5%). Just 4 central banks reported making transition-related investments (7.8%).

The biggest challenge central banks face to integrating sustainable investing into reserve management remains integration with the central bank mandate. Forty-seven out of 93 respondents (51.1%) ranked it in first place, parallel to 46.9% of 81 respondents last year.

Central banks’ core mandates focus on high-quality sovereign bonds such as US Treasuries, many of which are not ESG-labelled. Capacity and scrutiny around greenwashing or greenhushing presents a notable challenge, complicating the assessment of genuinely sustainable investments. Although some reserve managers said there is a gradual expansion of eligible instruments in global markets, they also cited reputational risks due to relatively shallow markets, and politicisation or mandate creep, as limiting factors.

“While managing foreign reserves, central banks usually play the role of long-term, market-neutral investors. Sustainability goals are mainly within the government’s mandate, and sustainable investing initiatives could interfere with national policy and impact central bank independence,” said a reserve manager of a central bank in Europe.

Note

1. Percentages in tables may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

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