Appendix 2: Survey responses and comments

Below are comments provided by reserve managers to the survey questions.

1. Which in your view are the most significant risks facing reserve managers in 2026?

As investors of debt instruments, the trajectory of interest rates, and the externalities that affect them (for example, a stock market correction and inflation trends), are the main risk factors to consider. As the trajectory of the world’s leading central bank (the Federal Reserve) is increasingly unclear, this factors as the highest risk.

Central banks’ monetary policy decisions will have a huge impact on reserves managers’ decisions in 2026.

Credit events are viewed as a key risk as it threatens the primary investment objective of capital preservation.

For reserve managers, the key concerns are the risks that can directly affect the safety, liquidity and value of reserve assets. Changes in global interest rates, geopolitical developments and sovereign fiscal conditions tend to have a more immediate impact on reserve portfolios than broader trends in global economic growth.

Geopolitical developments, recently even more uncertain, may have wide-ranging consequences, affecting economic growth, trade links, risk aversion and financial market conditions. The fiscal position of several advanced economies remains deteriorated with limited scope for consolidation. While this is unlikely to change overall reserve management policy, the risk of further ratings downgrades could lead to adjustments to strategic asset allocation. The risk of an emerging bubble in equity markets (especially US) might discourage further diversification of foreign reserves.

Geopolitical escalation, an evolving economic cycle, the role of the dollar and ongoing market volatility. The key trends and risks driving central bank strategies are shifting, resulting in reserve managers realigning their approach across a number of significant areas.

Geopolitical fragmentation – reflected in military conflicts, protectionist trade measures and sustained trade disputes – has emerged as a key source of instability in global markets. These dynamics elevate risk premia, intensify market volatility, and weaken the predictability of economic conditions. The combined impact constrains economic growth and contributes to inflationary pressures, posing significant challenges for macroeconomic stability and policy co-ordination at the national and international levels.

Geopolitical issues are the most important risk drivers, with an ascending need to finance defence expansion globally, as well as to establish new supply chains by trying to overcome unstable levels of US tariffs. Consequential rise of sovereign borrowings and tariff/new supply chain-driven inflation is a second major risk source. AI infrastructure spending reaches unsustainable levels, so the bursting AI bubble is another very important risk driver.

Geopolitical tensions and global monetary policy are the most significant risks in 2026 as they can trigger sudden market disruptions, capital flow reversals, sanctions risk, and sharp repricing across currencies and bond markets, with immediate implications for the safety and liquidity of reserve assets. Unsustainable fiscal deficits remain an important concern, as persistently high debt levels may undermine sovereign credibility over time and increase longer-term risks to core reserve holdings.

Geopolitical tensions are expected to be a key driver of global financial markets, as a more confrontational US foreign policy coincides with ongoing conflicts (Russia-Ukraine, China-Taiwan, etc). These dynamics could trigger a risk-off shift in investor sentiment, putting pressure on emerging-market currencies and underscoring the need for adequate FX reserves to safeguard exchange-rate stability. At the same time, uncertainty surrounding monetary policy, particularly in the US, amid persistent inflation risks and pressures on policy independence, amid widening fiscal deficits, may heighten volatility in financial markets, especially in the bond market. In addition, potential credit events in private credit markets and elevated asset valuations represent critical risks to monitor, as any materialisation could prompt global investors to de-risk and drive liquidity back into safe-haven assets, further weighing on emerging-market currencies.”

Geopolitical tensions have made reserve managers more cautious, gradually driving diversification away from US assets, greater focus on liquidity and safety, and increased interest in gold and non‑traditional currencies.

Geopolitical tensions pose the most significant risks.

Global monetary policy and interest rate dynamics remain the most immediate risk. Volatile inflation follows as it increases uncertainty over real returns and policy paths. Geopolitical tensions matter due to potential market disruptions. Elevated asset prices, fiscal deficits and credit events add fragility, while depressed global growth is a secondary concern.

Global monetary policy and interest rates are the most significant risk in 2026 due to uncertainty around the timing and pace of easing and its impact on duration and currency risk. Volatile inflation remains a key concern amid uneven disinflation. Geopolitical tensions continue to pose material risks to reserve safety and liquidity, while weaker global growth and fiscal deficits are viewed as more gradual, medium-term challenges. Elevated asset prices are supported by liquidity, and credit events are seen as the least significant risk, given resilient financial systems.

Growing US debt and continued geopolitical tensions together with the process of deglobalisation could continue to create significant uncertainty for investors.

If there is a risk of a conflict between two Nato blocs, what else can be marked as [the] number-one risk? If foreign policies are personalised, what bigger risk for free market principals can be found? We had the GFC, Covid, a sharp increase in inflation – all were solved by policy-makers. But who can solve a crisis that was caused by policy-makers?

In 2026, reserve managers are likely to face the greatest challenges from geopolitical tensions, which can disrupt markets and capital flows unpredictably. Global monetary policy and interest rate uncertainty follow closely, influencing yields, exchange rates and liquidity conditions. Elevated asset prices increase vulnerability to sudden repricing, while unsustainable fiscal deficits could affect sovereign debt dynamics over the medium term. Volatile inflation adds complexity to portfolio decisions, whereas depressed global growth and isolated credit events are considered less immediate risks, though they remain under close observation.

In our view, global monetary policy (especially US monetary policy) and interest rates, volatile inflation and unsustainable fiscal deficits are the most significant risks in 2026.

In the medium term, we view unsustainable fiscal deficits as also being an important factor that could affect reserve management.

Inflation and monetary policy cycles are a challenge in order to set strategic asset allocation. Geopolitical tensions must be taken into consideration, as well.

Monetary policy interest rates and volatile inflation are the top two risks that could affect our foreign reserves in 2026.

Ongoing and emerging geopolitical conflicts are a major risk because they influence trade, capital flows, commodity prices and financial market correlations.

Ongoing conflicts could trigger sudden risk-off episodes, affecting liquidity due to flight to quality. Shifts in Fed, ECB, BoE and other major central bank policies will directly impact yields, FX flows and reserve valuations.

Persistent fiscal imbalances in major economies pose a structural risk through higher term premia, increased issuance and potential crowding-out effects. Monetary policy uncertainty remains elevated as central banks balance inflation risks against weakening growth, contributing to volatility across yield curves.

Recent global escalation in conflict raises concerns. Such developments could have an impact on currency exchange, the flow of goods and services, and increase the risk of payment system fragmentation. In extreme cases, these escalations can lead to complete or partial losses of reserves in general. Additionally, they increase the likelihood of credit events, including defaults, which can result in significant losses across many industries.

Reserve managers in 2026 face a broad set of risks, with geopolitical tensions and global monetary policy shifts posing the greatest challenges. Fiscal pressures, inflation uncertainty and elevated asset prices add to the complexity of the environment, underscoring the need for cautious portfolio strategies and strong risk management.

The global markets are poised to be affected by Trump’s tariffs.

The most significant risk for 2026 stems from geopolitical tensions, which have the potential to trigger sudden market shocks, disrupt global trade and amplify financial volatility. Closely following this are concerns around unsustainable fiscal deficits and the global monetary policy environment: elevated borrowing levels combined with higher interest rates can substantially increase funding costs and raise questions about debt sustainability. Persistently volatile inflation also remains a key risk for real returns, as it may force monetary policy to remain restrictive for longer. Finally, credit events represent a moderate but non-negligible risk, particularly in a prolonged high interest rate environment.

The risk landscape for reserve managers in 2026 remains highly challenging, shaped by an uncertain global monetary environment and persistent geopolitical tensions. These risks underscore the importance of maintaining a prudent and conservative reserve management strategy, with a strong focus on liquidity, high-quality assets and diversification. In this context, close monitoring of global interest rate developments, inflation dynamics and geopolitical shocks remains essential to safeguard reserve adequacy and ensure the country’s capacity to absorb external shocks.

These are all significant risks.

Tight credit spreads, elevated gold price and a potential AI bubble are the main concerns.

Uncertainties surrounding US actions, foreign policies and conflicts in the Middle East and their impact on commodity prices will be the key themes in 2026.

US inflation has the potential to change the course of the Federal Reserve. Asset price bubbles can be a source of market instability. Increased geopolitical tensions and uncertainty could lead to volatility in asset prices.

We believe geopolitical tensions, political unpredictability and uncertainty will be important considerations for reserve managers in 2026. We expect fixed-income portfolios to be subject to significant price volatility due to concerns about fiscal deficits and political uncertainties. Elevated asset prices in stock, metal and credit markets make these markets prone to rapid price corrections with a risk of contagion. For this reason, we have placed these three themes at the forefront for 2026.

We believe that in 2026 the dominant risks are political and structural rather than cyclical or market-driven.

We view that major themes expected to drive financial markets include fiscal sustainability, divergent monetary policy paths across key central banks, evolving trade and industrial policy dynamics, technological shifts – especially in AI-enabled investment – and geopolitical tensions.

With [a] huge allocation held in USD portfolio[s] and in [the] USA region, geopolitical tensions exert pressure on our reserve management for 2026.

2. What do you think will be the most important factors affecting your reserve management over the next five years?

Again, the trajectory of rates factors as the most relevant theme in the medium term, as the portfolio composition is expected to remain centred on debt instruments.

Although the development of AI services and climate change are unlikely to have a direct impact on the management of our foreign exchange reserves, they may shape future macroeconomic conditions and the situation in financial markets.

Following 2025, where there was a general bias towards monetary policy easing, we expect monetary policy divergence to drive flow and investments with continuation of some fundamental risk, including trade and industrial shifts, and fiscal risk lingering. We also expect AI investments to continue supporting global growth.

For our reserves, the most important factors are those that directly affect liquidity, risk and asset allocation. Developments in global interest rates, the role of the US dollar and market infrastructure are particularly relevant for our reserve management over the coming years. Sustainability and geopolitics remain important, but their impact is mainly reflected through these core financial and operational channels.

Geopolitical factors play a significant role in determining the accessibility of crude oil reserves. Given that this is a country dependent on oil exports, this could have a serious impact, reducing its contribution to foreign exchange reserves.

Geopolitics is expected to be the dominant influence on reserve management over the next five years, as rising geopolitical fragmentation, sanctions risk and geoeconomic competition increasingly shape safe-asset preferences, currency allocation decisions and access to global financial markets. In this context, developments related to central bank independence – particularly in major reserve currency jurisdictions – are being closely monitored. Any sustained perception of reduced monetary policy autonomy could weaken confidence in a reserve currency by undermining its credibility as a store of value, potentially leading to higher inflation risk premia and greater volatility along the yield curve. This would render the management of reserve portfolios challenging, especially holdings of sovereign debt in core reserve currencies. The role of the US dollar remains central, but geopolitical developments and shifts in policy communication have contributed to diversification dynamics among some reserve managers, including increased allocations to other assets such as gold. While the US dollar is expected to retain its dominant reserve currency role in the near term, risks of gradual erosion over the medium to long term are being closely monitored. In parallel, divergent inflation and interest rate trajectories across major economies are expected to remain key drivers of portfolio allocation decisions across currencies and along the yield curve. Technology, particularly AI and data analytics, is increasingly shaping reserve management practices. AI tools can enhance risk monitoring, improve scenario analysis and support portfolio optimisation, but their impact is likely to be gradual and complementary to traditional macroeconomic and geopolitical factors, rather than transformative, over the next five years.

Geopolitics largely influences all other factors listed. Since our reserves are largely denominated in USD and invested in US assets, we place a great deal of significance on the role of the US dollar, inflation and interest rates.

Incorporation of AI in our operations will be critical in the near term. This will require extra budgets to cover the technology and training for staff.

Inflation and interest rate dynamics will remain the primary driver of reserve management decisions, shaping portfolio duration, valuation risk and income generation.

Inflation and interest rates are the key driver due to their direct effect on returns and portfolio risk. Geopolitics and US Federal Reserve independence follow, reflecting concerns over policy credibility and financial stability. The role of the US dollar, sustainability and AI/technology are viewed as secondary factors over the next five years.

Inflation and interest rates remain the top priorities due to their direct impact on asset valuations and returns. Closely following, the US dollar’s dominance makes its exchange rate a primary concern, as fluctuations significantly affect reserve values and trade balances. In third place, US Federal Reserve independence is critical for maintaining market credibility and long-term monetary stability. While transformative, AI’s impact is currently limited to optimising existing processes, rather than driving core strategy. Geopolitical events influence management indirectly through economic consequences like inflation, prompting reactive adjustments. Finally, while ESG considerations are growing, they remain secondary to the core mandates of safety, liquidity and returns.

Inflation and rates will continue to be the most important factor. However, geopolitics and diversification will lead to greater allocation outside of the US dollar.

Our reserve management decisions, especially those concerning our fixed income portfolios, will be greatly affected by economic activity, inflation rates and monetary policy in major economies. The US dollar exchange rate is also important for the composition of our foreign exchange reserves. We believe the independence of the US Federal Reserve will affect term premiums, so we will closely follow related issues, particularly as they pertain to the performance of our fixed income portfolios.

Over the next couple of years, reserve management will be shaped most by movements in inflation and interest rates, ongoing geopolitical shifts and changes in the global role of the US dollar. At the same time, central bank independence, rapid technological advances and rising sustainability considerations will increasingly influence strategic decisions.

Over the next five years, global FX reserves managers will rigorously assess whether the US dollar’s role as the dominant global reserve currency continues, amid rising global fragmentation. In addition, monetary policy-related factors – such as inflation dynamics, interest rate prospects and the Federal Reserve’s credibility and independence – will be critical, given their influence on yield movements and exchange rate dynamics. Escalating geopolitical tensions are also expected to become increasingly important considerations, as they shape risk sentiment, exert pressure on emerging-market currencies and ultimately underscore the need for adequate foreign exchange reserves

Over the next five years, reserve management will be driven primarily by external shocks and stability sustainability.

Really difficult to rank, all are very important.

Reserve management becomes more strategic. The dollar is unlikely to lose its status as the primary reserve currency over the next five years. But regional trade settlement in local currencies and expanded use of non-USD clearing systems will be taken into consideration.

Reserve management over the next five years will be primarily influenced by inflation and interest rate dynamics, which will remain central to decisions on asset allocation, duration and risk management in an uncertain global environment. Geopolitical tensions are expected to continue shaping market volatility and reinforcing the need for high liquidity and safe assets, while the US dollar will keep its pivotal role in ensuring external payments and financial stability, alongside a cautious and gradual diversification strategy. Confidence in US monetary policy, particularly the independence of the Federal Reserve, will remain critical for global market stability. At the same time, advances in AI and financial technology will support improved forecasting and risk monitoring, and sustainability considerations will be progressively incorporated, without compromising the core objectives of liquidity, capital preservation and resilience.

The effects from the Trump policies create significant uncertainty on the financial markets, which, combined with his trading policy, could affect the inflation dynamic.

The increasing influence of geopolitical actors introduces substantial uncertainty into portfolio management, as policy and strategic decisions are difficult to anticipate. Concurrently, the accelerated adoption of artificial intelligence is reshaping market behaviour and economic structures. Together, these developments are likely to influence medium‑ to long‑term economic growth prospects and labour market outcomes over the coming years.

The recent decline of the US dollar has triggered unexpected turbulence in financial markets. Nevertheless, the US dollar continues to play a central role in global reserve composition and international funding. Inflation and interest rates remain critical drivers of the global economy, influencing growth prospects, capital flows and financial conditions. At the same time, artificial intelligence and technological innovation are key themes in financial markets, as they enhance data analysis, improve decision-making and strengthen risk-monitoring capabilities. Geopolitical risks rank second in importance, given their ability to rapidly affect market volatility and liquidity.

These are all significant risks.

This is based on the asset classes we invest in.

We think that threats of the current US administration to Fed independence, and the subsequent effect on interest rates and inflation, will be the most important factors affecting our reserves management [over] the [next few] years.

While in the past, the role of the USD was mainly undermined by the rise of the RMB and euro, today, it is undermined by the US itself.

While inflation and monetary policy will continue to be a theme in decision-making, aspects of technology and sustainability may become more prominent. Central banks and developing economies will have to catch on quickly in order to remain relevant as the financial landscapes change.

3. Which of the below countries’ bond markets do you think will see relative outperformance/underperformance in the coming year?

A lax monetary policy from the Federal Reserve will probably boost asset prices in the US.

Again, very difficult to tell. I do not like the massive deficits and growing government debt almost everywhere, so I am waiting for the investors to demand more compensation for this.

Based on current economic growth, interest rates levels and geopolitical environment.

Circumstances like low inflation and lower yields support China’s performance and contained inflation supports Germany’s performance. Sticky inflation hurts the UK, while fiscal deficits and potential sticky inflation could impact US bond market performance.

From our perspective as reserve managers, this ranking reflects where we see greater stability, predictability and depth in sovereign bond markets over the coming year. Germany and the US stand out because of their safe-haven role and very liquid markets. Australia and Canada follow with solid fiscal positions and steady policy environments. The UK and France face relatively higher fiscal and inflation pressures, while Japan and China present more policy and structural uncertainty, which makes them comparatively less attractive for conservative reserve allocations.

Given the high level of uncertainty currently prevailing, it is particularly difficult to answer this question.

Higher starting yields, moderating inflation and scope for further term‑premium compression support total returns. Prospective Fed easing, especially with the expected change of Fed chair, adds duration tailwinds. USTs may also benefit from their safe-haven status, as well amidst geopolitical tensions. Yields on UK gilts are likely to fall in 2026, driven by a more benign inflation and tepid growth outlook. These may allow for room from outperformance if [the] BoE pivots towards easing. However, while fiscal concerns have lowered, we believe these are likely to re-emerge if political uncertainties persist. Given our diverging view on US versus EU rates in 2026, we anticipate fiscal dynamics pushing Bund 10y yields toward 3% by year-end, while UST 10y should finish the year below its starting level. Moreover, France faces a 50% probability of a credit rating downgrade in 2026 from at least one major rating agency due to persistent fiscal challenges, which may lead to wider OAT-Bund spread. In general, US credit markets are expected to outperform European markets in excess returns in our baseline scenario for 2026, albeit by a very narrow margin. China’s disinflation/deflation pressures and policy support favour stable to lower yields – onshore demand should remain strong for high‑quality duration. Demand for China government bonds may increase amidst efforts to diversify away from US Treasuries. In fact, China’s seven-year government bond auction drew a record bid-to-cover ratio of 5.91 on January 21, underscoring the role of Chinese sovereign debt as a hedge against global instability. The Bank of Japan kept its policy rate unchanged at 0.75% on January 23, 2026, but market forecasts indicate a series of potential rate hikes through 2026–2027, with expectations of the rate reaching 1.00–1.25%, depending on yen weakness and inflation trends. Australia’s stickier services inflation and lingering RBA [Reserve Bank of Australia] hawkishness risk further curve volatility and underperformance versus peers.

Markets with stronger fiscal credibility and clearer disinflation trends are expected to outperform.

Outperformance is assessed from a European perspective – ie, considering euro-denominated valuations. US markets might keep outperforming. However, the US administration is desperate for further USD weakening, so, in euro terms, this might appear the least profitable investment. Other markets are assessed according to their monetary policy projections.

The conditions on sovereign debt markets may be influenced by diverging monetary policies as well as the individual fiscal situation of particular countries.

The Fed could deliver more cuts than the market positioning due to the interference of Trump in FOMC [Federal Open Market Committee] decisions.

[The] PBoC accommodative stance supports liquidity, but structural growth challenges and FX considerations may weigh on relative returns.

The ranking reflects differences in inflation dynamics, monetary policy cycles, fiscal risks and relative valuation across markets.

The US bond market outperforms not just because of yields and Fed policy, but because the underlying economy is stronger, more resilient and more trusted than most peers’. That economic foundation ensures global investors continue to support Treasuries as the benchmark safe‑haven asset.

The US offers unmatched liquidity and depth, and expected rate cuts support stronger and more reliable bond returns. On the other end, China has policy uncertainty, capital controls and geopolitical tensions, which reduce both return potential and reserve usability.

This ranking reflects a risk-adjusted perspective, prioritising liquidity, fiscal sustainability and policy credibility, which are key considerations for reserve management.

Treasuries remain the baseline global safe asset.

UK and European bonds are benefiting from market-priced rate cuts and contained inflation, which tends to support lower yields/higher prices, increasing prospective returns. US Treasuries and Canada may see less aggressive easing, limiting bond rallies. Japan’s large sovereign market is transitioning from decades of ultra-low rates, but higher yields limit price upside.

US bond market is expected to continue to outperform, supported by attractive yields, the potential for further Fed cuts and their role as the primary global safe-haven asset amid rising geopolitical tensions this year. China’s bond market is also projected to outperform, as co-ordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus, alongside easing trade tensions, should support a sustained economic recovery and continued appreciation of the CNY. These factors are likely to sustain strong global investor interest in diversifying into Chinese bonds and to extend the sizeable bond inflows to China recorded last year. Bond market performance in the UK, Australia and Canada is expected to be more moderate, reflecting relatively attractive yields, gradual economic recovery and policy rates that are likely to remain on hold, with limited scope for further cuts. Meanwhile, European bond markets, particularly Germany and France, are expected to underperform, as concerns over widening fiscal deficits and persistent geopolitical tensions weigh on investor sentiment, alongside market expectations that the ECB could eventually resume policy tightening in 2026. Japan’s bond market is also likely to underperform, amid rising fiscal deficit concerns and the Bank of Japan’s limited scope for further rate hikes, coupled with relatively low yield levels.

We have no official opinion regarding country outperformance going forward. We are hard pegged versus the US dollar, so reserve assets are denominated in US dollars.

4. Are geopolitical risks incorporated in your risk management/asset-allocation decision-making?

4a. If yes, what changes have you made in the last 12 months?

Considering asset allocation to high-quality supranational and developed market debt in line with the reserve management framework.

Currently completing the external mandate on active management of SDR.

Due to law, more than 95% of FX reserves are denominated in EUR, hence the investment universe is predetermined.

Expected volatility embedded in asset prices is incorporated as an input in our asset-allocation process. Therefore, any geopolitical risk that is already priced into asset prices is implicitly taken into account.

Geopolitical risk can be incorporated in risk management as a variety of improvements concerning all aspects of the investment management. In particular, as central banks are typically conservative investors, the safety and liquidity aspects of reserve operations are primary concerns for reserve managers. Deeper research on counterparties, further diversification of investment infrastructure and avoidance of transactions that at some point could be reached by sanctions are among measures that can be carefully implemented by reserve managers [in light of a] rise in geopolitical risk.

Geopolitical risks are actively incorporated into our risk management and asset-allocation decision-making. Over the past 12 months, adjustments have primarily focused on currency exposure and asset-class allocation to mitigate potential market volatility arising from geopolitical developments. While other dimensions – such as custodians, counterparties, issuers or gold holdings – remained largely unchanged, ongoing monitoring of global events continues to inform portfolio strategy and diversification decisions.

[Geopolitical] risks are both directly and indirectly included. Directly through asset valuation and subsequent rebalancing and indirectly through risk management.

Geopolitical risks are embedded in the risk management framework through issuer and counterparty selection, diversification and jurisdictional risk assessment. Recent adjustments have been incremental, focused on reinforcing resilience and risk mitigation, rather than altering the core strategic asset allocation.

Have invested in gold holdings in 2025.

In light of heightened political and geopolitical tensions, we have proactively revised country limits for selected markets within our investment universe. This adjustment aims to contain downside risks, preserve capital and ensure that reserve management remains aligned with the bank’s risk tolerance, while maintaining sufficient diversification and liquidity.

Increase in gold allocation.

Increasing geopolitical risk has been one of the drivers of the decision to increase gold holdings. Such risk is taken into account in the overall reserve management policy (asset allocation, counterparty selection), but has not stimulated any further adjustments.

No additional issuer or currencies, but individual weights have been changed.

No changes have been made to the strategic asset allocation over the past 12 months. Nevertheless, geopolitical risks have been explicitly incorporated into the investment framework, which is reflected in a diversified strategy across multiple countries and asset classes.

Regardless of the so-called independence of central banks from their governments, reserve management must follow the foreign policy of a country.

The gold allocation was adjusted to bring it back in line with its historical share of reserves.

We continue to look for diversification, and have done that in currencies and issuers. We are considering other changes in order to incorporate more diversification via new custodians, location of assets and counterparties.

We have expanded our counterparty network and ensured robust geographical diversification.

We have increased our gold allocation by conducting domestic gold ore purchases against domestic currency until October 2025. The reason was not to hedge geopolitical risks, but to accumulate reserves. However, we have enjoyed the secondary benefit of gold reserves as gold is seen as a safe haven against geopolitical risks. Taking into account domestic market conditions, domestic gold ore purchases against the local currency were paused in October 2025.

We have made some changes to the allocation of our reserve currencies and asset classes, and also started investing in gold in December 2025.

We tried to find bigger diversification and decrease the rate of concentration to some issuers and counterparties. We are considering some currency diversification as well.

Yes, increased volatility is included in our strategic asset allocation.

5. Do you employ active management strategies with the objective of outperforming your benchmark?

5a. If yes, how?

Active management is applied selectively within defined risk limits.

Active management is very much about skills and knowledge. Our skills allow us to be an active manager within fixed income, while other asset classes are managed passively.

Active management strategies with the objective of outperforming the benchmark are carried out through our external fund manager.

At a strategic level, portfolio management begins with determining the overall FX allocation, followed by duration positioning within the allocated currencies relative to benchmark weights (overweight or underweight). Overlay strategies are then implemented to enhance performance versus the benchmark. To further improve total returns, we actively optimise asset selection, manage yield-curve positioning and continuously refine portfolio exposures through relative value trading opportunities.

Enhanced indexation.

Internal credit spread positioning achieved through money market[s] only, achieving spreads above risk-free rates through investments up to A-rated banks.

Internal portfolio managers and internal investment committee can actively steer the investments within certain limits. Mandates are awarded to external asset managers if there is an efficiency gain in doing so. External asset managers are also used to benchmark internal asset management.

Main focus is on spread and relative value strategies.

The strategy seeks active improvement versus the benchmark through the deployment of multiple investment strategies.

We adopt a limited reserve management approach, intervening only when necessary or when attractive investment opportunities arise, rather than engaging in continuous active management. Our strategy is benchmark‑aligned to ensure outperformance, while maintaining safety and liquidity.

We can use two active layers over the strategic benchmark. One, longer-term (at least one quarter) view, and with a slightly bigger risk budget, is for equities, whether we overweight them or underweight [them]. This decision is taken by the investment committee. The other active layer is active positions by individual portfolio managers, who can take active positions with a relatively small risk budget in duration, curve, currencies and credit.

We employ active management strategies to outperform our benchmark while preserving the core reserve objectives of safety, liquidity and capital preservation. Active positioning is primarily expressed through duration management and yield‑curve positioning, allowing us to respond to changing inflation dynamics, monetary policy expectations and relative value across maturities. We also use credit‑spread positioning selectively within high‑quality issuers to enhance carry, while maintaining strict risk limits. FX positioning is deployed tactically to manage currency risk and exploit short‑ to medium‑term valuation. At the portfolio level, asset‑class weightings are adjusted cautiously to reflect shifts in the macro and market environment. In addition, we allocate to external managers where they can provide diversification benefits or access to additional asset classes. Relative‑value trading across markets is not a core strategy, as it typically requires short-selling, which is not part of our investment approach.

We have a passive investment strategy.

We have passive exposure towards equity markets and corporate bond markets through ETFs, and some of our investments in sovereigns are classified as held-to-maturity, but the majority of our fixed income portfolios are actively, internally managed with the aim [of] benefit[ing] from short-term market movements.

We use an array of tactical strategies to outperform the benchmark as well as use external managers to enhance diversification and explore alternative investment styles such as an absolute return portfolio.

While the central bank does not currently employ active management strategies, it is allocating a limited portion of reserve assets to select external managers in line with its investment policy objectives who are in turn using active strategies.

5b. Do you use hedging strategies to manage your FX exposure?

5c. If yes, which instruments?

Considering use of FX swaps and forwards.

FX exposure is partly hedged to the numeraire currency within the externally managed portfolio. Hedging is implemented using a range of instruments, including FX swaps and forwards, FX futures, FX options and cross-currency swaps, depending on market conditions and the specific risk profile of the portfolio. These strategies help manage currency risk while maintaining flexibility to respond to evolving macroeconomic and market developments.

Hedging against one of the major currencies would de facto be an alternative to the adjustment of the currency composition of foreign reserves.

Hedging only via neutral currency composition targeting.

Liability matching is the main strategy, as such, not taking an active currency position.

Macro-level currency hedge through the strategic currency composition is achieved, but no central bank balance-sheet hedge.

No hedging.

Our currency exposure is aligned to the basket weight, which provides a natural hedge.

The sovereign portfolio includes foreign exchange hedging against US dollar exposure.

This is done through the external asset managers.

We can use derivatives to hedge FX exposure, but there has not been a need to do so recently.

We do not currently use any hedging products or include hedging strategies to manage our FX exposure.

We do not hedge against local currency in order not to interfere with … monetary policy.

We do not hedge FX risk at the moment.

We do not hedge our equity exposure, fully hedge back to EUR fixed income for our own funds reserve.

Yes. Derivatives are used primarily to manage foreign exchange risk while selectively supporting yield-enhancement strategies.

6. Do you intend to change your FX and gold reserve levels in 2026?

6a. If increasing, what would be the reasons?

6b. If yes, how do you intend to increase reserves?

Accumulation is one great need.

Any changes to gold reserves in 2026 would aim to keep gold at an appropriate share of total reserves, based on diversification and risk management, not short-term market moves.

Consideration to include gold as a strategic diversification asset and return enhancer within the portfolio.

Gold prices continue to rise amid uncertainty in global financial markets and ongoing geopolitical tensions.

Gold reserves increase in 2026.

Likely that the government will issue a new EUR bond in 2026 to maintain/increase FX levels – but no plans to change gold reserve levels.

The central bank maintains a local gold purchase programme, which increases the gold reserves.

The central bank views strengthening international reserves as essential for effective monetary policy and financial stability. In this respect, as long as market conditions allow, the central bank will maintain its reserve build-up strategy in 2026.

The level of the FX reserves is dependent on monetary policy decisions. All else equal, we expect the reserves to increase in general due to positive return expectations.

The need to maintain investor confidence and be prepared for currency interventions are some of the reasons why countries like ours are likely to increase their FX reserves.

We are running a programme of regular FX reserves sales, but there is no specific level of reserves. These sales more or less compensate the inflows from our clients.

We assess the magnitude of our foreign reserves as adequate, so we do not take any measures aimed at increasing their magnitude, but the foreign reserves are expected to increase due to external flows.

We currently intend to maintain FX and gold reserve levels in 2026. Reserve allocations are regularly reviewed to ensure alignment with core objectives, including maintaining adequate liquidity, supporting potential FX interventions, meeting import cover requirements and preserving investor confidence. Any changes would be considered only if shifts in macroeconomic conditions or reserve adequacy metrics warrant adjustments.

We do not have any gold, and do not plan to buy, either. FX reserves are growing slightly, financed through Eurosystem Target accounts.

We do not hold gold as part of our reserves. On the other hand, at present, our reserves level (as measured by the IMF’s reserve adequacy ratio) is deemed adequate.

We do not hold gold reserves.

7. Have you intervened in FX markets in the last 12 months?

7a. If yes, have you sold or bought local currency?

A relative excess supply of foreign currency in the FX market meant that no intervention was required.

FX interventions were conducted through the auction-based foreign exchange market mechanism, involving both purchases and sales of local currency. Operations were aimed at smoothing short-term imbalances in supply and demand, and supporting orderly market functioning, without targeting a specific exchange rate level.

In net terms, we have bought EUR in the last 12 months and sold local currency.

In the normal course of volatility management.

Mostly bought.

Purchase through foreign exchange auction.

Resources are maintained in other currencies solely for public-sector payments.

The central bank does not initiate these FX dealings with local commercial banks, but rather responds when they request to sell or buy US dollars [to/from] us.

The central bank has intervened by buying local currency, but some past repo operations have expired in the period, which have the effect of a ‘sell’ of local currency to the local market. In net terms, the central bank bought local currency.

The central bank has no commitment to any exchange-rate level, and does not conduct FX buying or selling transactions to determine the level or direction of exchange rates. To ensure efficient functioning of the FX market and promote healthy price formation, the central bank closely monitored exchange-rate developments and related risk factors, and employed suitable instruments.

The central bank made a net purchase of local currency against EUR.

The central bank operates under currency board arrangement[s], and has not been involved in market operations due to legal restrictions.

The central bank participates in the spot market to limit excessive … volatility, whether it is appreciating or depreciating.

The central bank runs a crawling peg exchange rate regime whereby it sells and buys foreign currencies [on] demand to maintain the domestic currency. Therefore, there is a need to maintain a significant amount of foreign reserves.

The interventions on the domestic FX market, in both directions, resulted [in] modest net-FX purchases.

The pace and quantum of intervention have declined considerably compared to the period following the Covid-19 pandemic. This reduction reflects the gradual stabilisation of financial markets and the broader recovery of the national economy, as confidence returns and market conditions normalise.

The peg to the ZAR and free flow of capital movements within the Common Monetary Area necessitate the central bank … provide[s] ZAR liquidity to the market to facilitate cross-border flows.

To moderate the volatility of the national currency exchange rate against the US dollar, the market is occasionally intervened in to buy and/or sell US dollars.

We intervened once, on a small scale, as part of a programme announced by the central bank in response to the confrontation with Iran.

We operate in a pegged currency regime.

Where there is volatility in the FX market, we intervene, both ways, to restore stability and assure confidence [for] market players and investors.

8. Regarding diversification, do you anticipate that over the next year reserve managers broadly will accelerate, slow down, reverse or not change the pace of diversification?

A more polarised world may see more diversification away from USD, especially if compounded by concerns about Fed independence.

[Accelerate,] due to the rise in global uncertainty.

Amid increasing geopolitical tensions and elevated uncertainty, diversification across asset classes, regions and sectors is a time-proven strategy to reduce portfolio volatility. Trump volatility could also mean opportunities for active management.

As foreign reserves grow, it is recommended to diversify to limit risk by investing in new asset classes and engaging new correspondent banks for returns.

As geopolitical risks persist, and considering the mid-term elections coming up in the US, more central banks will seek to diversify away from the US dollar, and buy more gold and other alternative currencies.

At current interest rate levels, we consider that total rate cuts in 2026 would not put too much pressure on the need for diversification to seek higher returns.

Diversification is expected to increase gradually, driven by risk management considerations rather than return-seeking, with continued emphasis on liquidity, safety and operational simplicity.

Diversification of reserve portfolios will continue to be driven by fiscal policies and geopolitical tensions.

Due to geopolitical tensions, risk aversion will increase and reserve managers will be more cautious.

Geopolitical and economic uncertainty have prompted central banks to reduce reliance on US dollar and euro assets. In addition, many central banks have been increasing their gold reserves as a hedge against geopolitical and economic uncertainty.

Geopolitical risk may prompt some central banks to further diversify currency composition of foreign reserves, while development of investment vehicles such as ETFs may facilitate investment in non-traditional asset classes.

Heightened geopolitical risks, uncertainty around monetary policy and concerns over inflation and fiscal sustainability are likely to prompt reserve managers to accelerate the pace of diversification over the next year, particularly across currencies, asset classes and jurisdictions to enhance resilience and risk management.

High volatility should push towards more diversification.

In general, we would expect the current trend of diversification to continue, given volatile and novel policy shifts by the US administration in addition to elevated levels of geopolitical tension.

Incremental currency diversification (euro, sterling, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar) increase[s] gold holdings.

Monitoring the Fed chair post as well as tariffs.

Our FX reserves are in EUR and USD mainly, and it is likely it will stay like that.

Over the next year, reserve managers are likely to accelerate diversification, but in a measured and cautious way, rather than through aggressive shifts. This reflects ongoing efforts to strengthen portfolio resilience in light of geopolitical developments, fiscal pressures and changing market conditions, while still preserving the core principles of safety and liquidity.

Over the next year, reserve managers are likely to pursue selective diversification to enhance resilience, while maintaining liquidity, safety and operational simplicity.

The pace of diversification will accelerate because reserve managers now see political risk as systemic, not just cyclical. The dollar remains dominant, but the strategic shift is towards multi‑currency, multi‑asset portfolios that can withstand shocks from geopolitics, sanctions and monetary divergence.

This is driven by the need to mitigate concentration risks and seek enhanced returns by exploring other asset classes, such as callables and structured notes.

This will depend on persistent uncertainties in the market from geopolitics and the changing market landscape.

Uncertain global geopolitical environment may lead to an increase in diversification for security reasons.

US-related risks and unpredictability.

We anticipate geopolitical tensions combined with bets on US interest rate cuts may prompt a renewed jump into precious metals by both central banks and ETFs.

We anticipate that reserve managers will remain cautious about risks carried over from 2025, including trade tensions, fiscal concerns, geopolitical developments and broader macroeconomic uncertainties. As a result, they are likely to seek additional returns through positioning for monetary policy divergence, while remaining vigilant to the potential spillover of these risks into 2026. In this environment, maintaining a well-diversified portfolio and prioritising risk-adjusted returns will be essential.

We believe that the trend of diversifying away from the dollar is growing, and we expect to see an acceleration of this trend this year. We expect the convergence of interest rates and central banks’ interest in gold to support this trend in 2026.

We expect reserve managers to accelerate diversification over the next year, driven by heightened geopolitical fragmentation. These developments are prompting a reassessment of concentration risks and a greater focus on portfolio resilience. Diversification is likely to be incremental, rather than abrupt. Nonetheless, the trend is clear: allocations are expected to expand towards gold, non-traditional reserve currencies.

8a. In the last 12 months, how did you position your reserve portfolio?

As we increase medium- to long-term investments, we must ensure sufficient funds remain in our call accounts to meet any unexpected payment obligations.

Changes following regular review of the reserves portfolio.

Considering the expected monetary policy paths of advanced-economy central banks, we slightly increased the duration of our fixed income portfolios to take advantage of higher yields. Additionally, as explained above, we increased our gold reserves by conducting domestic gold ore purchases against domestic currency until October 2025.

Credit exposure was increased slightly in 2025. We increased our gold holdings.

Diversification will depend on the monetary policy of each country and on the evolution of macroeconomic indicators.

Due to Ramp external portfolio management, we increased currency diversification by increasing investments in US dollar[s] and continue investing in US bonds. Also, we increased the duration of the portfolio under our management.

Duration increased primarily as a result of [our] rate-cutting cycle.

Given the high-yield environment of the eurozone government bonds, we decreased the liquidity and the exposure towards credit instruments, and we shifted our investments into high-quality financial instruments.

Gold increased due to valuation effects, not outright purchases.

Increased gold to counter any decline in USD.

No significant changes, just the outcome of the regular optimisation exercise.

Over the past 12 months, maintaining high portfolio liquidity while preserving the value of reserves has been a key priority alongside return generation. This approach reflects the pressures facing the country, including declining diamond revenues and heightened investment risks arising from trade tensions, geopolitical developments and fiscal pressures affecting the portfolio.

Over the past 12 months, positioning remained conservative, with no major changes to duration, credit quality or asset classes. Currency diversification increased slightly, while liquidity levels decreased mainly due to the timing of placements and cashflows, rather than a change in risk or maturity profile.

Portfolio adjustments focused on preserving liquidity and enhancing resilience.

Reserves were mainly positioned to be readily available for immediate use upon need.

Target duration increased by 0.5 years. No additional currencies or asset classes, but changed individual weights.

The bank continued to buy more gold in order to boost the reserves position as well [as] diversify the portfolio further.

There was a new government EUR issuance in the last 12 months, which did increase duration.

We closed our US MBS portfolio, which slightly brought down duration and decreased diversification between asset classes.

We have replaced [our] internally managed corporates portfolio with broader exposure gained with ETFs.

We increased the size of our liquidity portfolio as a result of the yearly SAA evaluation.

While the majority of our reserves remain USD-denominated, we have increased currency diversification, particularly within the internally managed portfolio, including an increased allocation to euros. On the duration front, reflecting views that inflation had peaked and expectations of potential Fed rate cuts, we substantially extended portfolio duration, focusing on the US Treasury curve. Credit exposure was reduced as spreads compressed and valuations became less attractive, prompting a shift towards higher-quality, more liquid sovereign instruments. Equity allocations were increased to capture potential growth opportunities, while the liquidity tranche was also upsized, resulting in a more liquid overall portfolio. Liquid alternatives were added as an eligible asset class to increase diversification within the portfolio, and gold holdings remained unchanged.

8b. In the next 12 months, how do you anticipate positioning your reserve portfolio?

2026 portfolio optimisation exercise still ongoing, but no significant changes expected in terms of asset allocation.

Addition of AUD.

Diversification, credit exposure to counter US-related risks.

Duration may increase due to a change in the fixed income benchmark. The anticipated catalyst for this move would be the continued steepening of the yield curve led by a decline in front-end US yields. It may make sense to extend duration as long-term yields become more attractive.

I’m assuming we will change our mandate in the next 12 months and start to invest in ETFs, and take maybe more credit exposure. Liquidity could stay the same or maybe decrease a bit.

Liquidity remains the primary objective of our foreign reserves management.

Over the next 12 months, positioning is expected to remain conservative while allowing for slightly greater flexibility. Currency diversification and gold holdings may increase gradually to strengthen portfolio resilience, while duration, credit quality and asset classes are likely to remain broadly unchanged. Liquidity may be increased modestly to maintain flexibility in an uncertain market environment.

Planning to go into corporate/financial institution bonds in 2026.

Positioning is expected to remain cautious, prioritising liquidity and capital preservation, with only incremental adjustments in duration as market conditions allow.

The [central] bank will buy more locally produced gold in local currency. This will help to increase the level of reserves.

The depreciation of the USD against EUR creates some diversification opportunities, and, given the tight spreads, the attractiveness of credit instruments remains quite low.

We are currently reviewing our long-term SAA, taking into account the latest capital market assumptions and evolving macroeconomic conditions. Over the next 12 months, portfolio positioning is expected to be tactical, rather than strategic, focusing on near-term opportunities and risk management. We anticipate increasing currency diversification and broadening asset-class exposure to enhance resilience and capture selective growth opportunities, while maintaining current positions in duration, credit, gold and liquidity. These adjustments will be guided by ongoing monitoring of geopolitical developments, interest rate expectations and market valuations, ensuring alignment with our core objectives of safety, liquidity and capital preservation.

We are likely to move funds from USD fixed deposits into global fixed income. This will see a small increase in duration, diversification and non-USD exposure.

We are planning to allocate part of the reserves to EUR-denominated credit instruments. As we do not have a EUR portfolio at the moment, it would increase our currency diversification, as well as increase our credit exposure and asset-class diversification.

We do not plan to change the current positioning of our portfolios as we believe our position is in line with our market expectations. However, we plan to expand the asset classes and instruments in which we invest.

We have already achieved the desired risk/return profile of our investment portfolios. But we will continue the process of gradually increasing gold holdings.

12c. How do you view strategic bitcoin reserve fund proposals?

At this stage, strategic bitcoin reserve fund proposals remain unsuitable for reserve portfolios. While such proposals may generate interest as a potential diversification tool, concerns around high volatility, regulatory uncertainty, limited liquidity and long-term store-of-value characteristics make it difficult to assess their appropriateness for central bank reserves. Careful monitoring of market developments and regulatory frameworks would be required before considering any allocation.

Bitcoin can be seen as an asset class similar to equities. The nodes of the blockchain represent the company (issuer), the amount of investment [in] the technology could be seen as … capital, and bitcoin could be seen as the product. Of course, the legal contract is missing, as well as insolvency law on the ‘issuer’.

Bitcoin cannot be a reserve asset in the traditional sense because it lacks the stability, yield and institutional frameworks that make Treasuries, gold or major currencies reliable. At best, it can serve as a speculative hedge or symbolic diversification tool – but not the backbone of sovereign reserves.

Bitcoin is a highly volatile asset and, in our assessment, does not qualify as a reserve asset.

Central banks can, of course, hold bitcoin as reserve assets if they want – however, there is no plan to do so at our central bank in the foreseeable future.

Central banks may oppose digital currencies because they can weaken control over monetary policy, threaten financial stability and increase risks related to regulation, cyber security and consumer protection.

Crypto assets are currently unsuitable for central bank portfolios due to their high volatility, limited liquidity, regulatory uncertainty, and elevated operational and fraud risks. They do not yet meet the requirements of safety, stability or broad acceptance as stores of value or means of exchange.

Cryptocurrencies still do not meet the basic requirements for reserve assets – trading volume as well as liquidity is insufficient. The high volatility and unpredictability of value as well as the risk of speculation and price manipulation limit their role as [a] store of wealth. Furthermore, operational risk related to hacker attacks, fraud and technological failures should not be neglected. The cryptocurrency market is fragmented, storage methods are insufficient, legal regulations are inconsistent and lacking transparency. The perception of cryptocurrencies as a mechanism used for money laundering, evading sanctions or conducting illegal operations may pose a reputational risk to central banks – institutions of public trust. However, dynamic technological development and the increasingly widespread use of cryptocurrencies may gradually strengthen their role in the global financial system. But their widespread use by central banks seems a long way off.

From the perspective of the central bank, strategic reserve assets are selected based on strict principles of safety [and] liquidity, especially in periods of market stress. While bitcoin represents an innovative and increasingly discussed financial asset, it currently does not exhibit the stability, usability and operational certainty required for official reserves.

Given the mandate to preserve reserves, we currently view bitcoin funds as too volatile and risky for our mandate.

I do not see how it differs from the [classic] Ponzi scheme – there is no real value in bitcoin.

It is a difficult asset class to value. The price volatility exceeds the risk tolerance.

Lack of expertise in the area to formulate an informed view.

Proposals for strategic bitcoin reserve funds raise significant concerns related to price volatility, valuation uncertainty, custody arrangements and the absence of a clear regulatory framework. Given these factors, among others, bitcoin is not currently considered suitable for inclusion in reserve investment.

Still considered … a very volatile asset.

Strategic bitcoin reserve proposals are mostly weak and, in many cases, conceptually flawed – the asset class is not suitable for central banks.

These digital currencies are not recommended as investments due to their volatility, high risk and lack of reliable historical data.

[Too-high] volatility for the level of risk the bank would be willing to take.

Typical volatility patterns of crypto/[stablecoins] are way higher than usual reserve assets’ volatility. Besides, quick liquidation of relevant amounts of such assets (when countries need it) is still uncertain, which makes it difficult to classify them as proper reserve assets.

13a. To what extent do you agree that the US dollar is still the safe-haven currency?

Although the importance of other currencies, especially the euro, is increasing, we think that the US dollar will continue to be the main reserve currency in the [next few] years.

As there is currently no other currency that can be used as an alternative to substitute the dollar, it continues to be a safe haven.

Despite gradual diversification trends, the US dollar remains the primary safe-haven currency due to its depth, liquidity and central role in global trade and financial markets.

Despite growing de-dollarisation discussions, the US dollar remains a key safe-haven currency due to the size and liquidity of US financial markets, especially Treasuries, which investors trust during crises. It still dominates global reserves, trade invoicing and commodity pricing, creating strong structural demand. Confidence in US institutions and the global reliance on dollar funding further support its status, while alternatives like the euro, yuan or gold still face limitations, making the dollar difficult to replace.

Geopolitical risk may force more diversification away from USD.

Geopolitical tension stimulates de-dollarisation debate/initiatives, mainly among developing economies, as well as further currency diversification and strengthening the role of major regional currencies. But the role of the USD is supported by a strong economy, developed payment system, mature financial markets, stable financial system – it would be really hard for other financial markets to offer a comparable level of development over the next couple of years.

Given geopolitical and credit-quality issues, it is losing its strength.

In periods of stress, investors still prioritise the ability to move large sums instantly without market disruption – something no alternative matches.

Increasingly, exposure to geopolitical tensions may accelerate the pace of de-dollarisation.

Mainly on account of USD market depth and liquidity, but not necessarily credit quality.

No alternative to the USD.

No other market has the depth and liquidity that the US market does.

Persistently high fiscal deficits and sovereign credit rating downgrades have somewhat weakened the perception of the United States as a safe-haven asset.

Safe being the reporting currency for many central banks. However, in consideration of internal conditions such as volatility and uncertainty, it does not showcase safety.

So far, de-dollarisation can be seen mostly as reflecting an increase in international trade involving relevant non-USD economies.

The diminishing faith of the investors in … US policies has affected the US currency as well, and, as such, we do not perceive traditional USD appreciation under market risk events.

The dollar will not lose dominance any time soon. However, central banks could hedge away temporarily from USD exposure.

The structural advantages enjoyed by the USD is still very much present. There are no credible alternatives at scale.

The US dollar has long been the base currency for exchange rate conversion, and remains the most widely used currency for international payments.

The US dollar is a safe-haven currency, but its dominance is being modestly challenged by alternatives like gold and other global safe-haven currencies such as Japanese yen, Swiss franc[s] and regional safe-haven currencies, especially under market stress scenarios. Rising US debt levels, trade policies and de-dollarisation concerns prompt some of the investors to cautiously consider alternatives. Therefore, while the dollar is generally seen as safe, it is not entirely immune to challenges, which is why ‘2 – Agree’ can reflect a slightly less absolute view.

The US dollar remains the pre-eminent safe-haven currency, primarily due to its unrivalled liquidity and the depth of the Treasury market. During periods of global stress, it continues to benefit from a ‘flight-to-safety’ effect, supported by the institutional credibility of the Federal Reserve.

The US dollar remains the primary safe-haven currency due to its deep and liquid markets, reserve currency status and role in global funding. However, markets are gradually exploring alternative currencies as additional safe haven[s].

The US dollar remains the primary safe-haven currency due to its unmatched liquidity, depth of markets and role in global trade and finance. While structural and fiscal considerations warrant monitoring, these have not materially undermined its safe-haven function in periods of stress.

The US dollar remains the primary safe-haven currency, given its global liquidity, stability and the depth of US financial markets. However, other assets like gold and certain sovereign bonds are increasingly considered as alternative safe havens during periods of global uncertainty.

The US dollar remains the primary safe-haven currency, though structural fiscal changes and geopolitical events might have diluted the level.

There appears to be a move to diversify reserves away from a large reliance on the US dollar, mainly as a way to spread risk and strengthen resilience, rather than signal any sharp shift. At the same time, while the dollar is still a vehicle currency, reserve managers increasingly see safety during stress as coming from a mix of assets, not just one currency.

There is no viable alternative or substitute yet.

There is too much political uncertainty in the US for the dollar to be really safe while Trump is in office. And it will take time to restore the trust – might take [tens of] years. I do not expect [a] big sale of dollar assets, though, rather reinvesting dividends/matured bonds more in other currencies.

This will remain the case as long as the US dollar remains the dominant currency in transactions and US Treasury bonds remain the most liquid fixed income market.

US dollar is still a safe-haven currency, mainly because of the depth and liquidity of US Treasury markets, its central role in global trade and finance, and the dollar’s tendency to appreciate in periods of global stress.

We believe that de‑dollarisation of global FX reserves is increasing, but that the process remains gradual and incremental, rather than structural or disruptive. Recent diversification efforts by reserve managers are primarily driven by geopolitical fragmentation, heightened sanctions risk and the need to enhance portfolio resilience, rather than by a fundamental loss of confidence in USD assets. In practice, liquidity constraints, market depth and operational considerations continue to limit both the pace and the scale of diversification away from the dollar. At the same time, we expect the USD to remain the global safe‑haven currency. Its dominant role is underpinned by the depth and liquidity of US financial markets, the breadth of high‑quality dollar‑denominated safe assets – particularly US Treasuries – and the dollar’s central position in global trade, financing and payment systems. Importantly, there is currently no credible alternative that matches the dollar across these dimensions, reinforcing its continued primacy in the international monetary system.

We believe that the trend of diversifying away from the dollar is growing, and we expect to see an acceleration of this trend this year. We expect the convergence of interest rates and central banks’ interest in gold to support this trend in 2026.

While much of the reallocation of FX reserves has gone to CNY and other currencies, USD and EUR still dominate levels.

Yes, the US dollar is still considered a safe‑haven [currency], but its status is under greater scrutiny in 2026 due to fiscal imbalances, trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical fragmentation. Investors continue to flock to the dollar during crises, yet diversification into gold and other currencies has accelerated.

13e. Are you considering changes to the composition of your USD portfolio in the next 12 months?

13f. If yes, which assets?

During the last 12 months, we closed our MBS exposure, reinvested quite evenly in US treasuries, equities, Australian bonds and Canadian bonds, so our overall US exposure declined a bit. For the next 12 months, our US exposure is expected to stay the same, but as the portfolio is growing and these additional funds are invested outside the US, the share of US in our portfolio is decreasing.

Increase was driven by our strategic asset-allocation process.

It would decline in the case of US Treasuries, and would likely remain unchanged for other US issuers.

Our currency allocation is determined by the SAA, [which] is based on the asset-liability matching principle. [Therefore,] the share of USD in our reserve portfolios depends on the currency structure of our FX liabilities and the course it will follow.

Probably more US issuers, but likely via ETFs.

This will purely be as a result of the strategic asset-allocation exercise, given the external mandate on the SDR. The SAA is also a liability-driven exercise, so the government’s obligations and eligible currencies play a role.

We have established absolute limits for Ramp external management of [our] US-denominated portfolio, and do not see space for increasing investments in US dollars.

We have replaced [our] internally managed corporates portfolio with broader exposure gained with ETFs.

13h. Do you think stablecoins will support the role of the USD as a reserve currency?

It is not about which currency stablecoin is following, it is about: a) the issuer – is it a bank or is it a non-bank?; and … b) the used infrastructure. If stablecoin is a form of a tokenised primary deposit, then obviously the bank as an issuer plays a significant role because there are plenty of very costly protections the banks are paying for (deposit insurance fund, resolution fund, minimum reserve requirements, regulation and supervision, own capital etc.). From that point of view, stablecoins issued by banks can be treated as tokenised T-bills.

Significant increase in the use of stablecoins will make it more difficult to control the money supply and implement monetary policy. The development of the stablecoin market may contribute to the outflow of capital from developing markets. Stablecoins may generate new mechanisms for transmitting shocks in the financial system, and a potential collapse of this market would pose a risk of serious consequences for the stability of the system.

Stablecoins aid in digital dollarisation, and support the case for the dollar as a global store of value, as people are able to save and trade dollars without the need for a US bank account, and are able to settle transactions in speedier venues than are offered by the traditional banking system.

Stablecoins are a payment mechanism, a currency to trade in the digital economy, not a reserve asset.

Stablecoins are becoming a possible alternative investment, given the passage of [the] Genius Act, which requires stablecoins to be backed by US government-issued securities.

Stablecoins are more likely to strengthen the USD’s transactional footprint than … replace official reserve holdings.

Stablecoins could entrench USD usage globally at the margin, especially in payments and financial plumbing – but they complement, rather than fundamentally transform, the dollar’s reserve currency status.

Stablecoins extend and modernise the dollar’s dominance by embedding it into digital finance, making it more accessible globally. However, their long‑term role as reserve assets depends on regulation, credibility and competition from CBDCs. If properly regulated, they could strengthen the USD’s reserve currency status, rather than weaken it.

Stablecoins have the potential to support and reinforce the role of the USD as a reserve currency, primarily by extending its use in digital payments, settlements and cross‑border transactions, rather than by transforming reserve portfolios themselves. USD‑pegged stablecoins effectively digitise dollar liquidity, increasing the currency’s reach and convenience, particularly in jurisdictions with weaker domestic payment systems or restricted access to traditional dollar funding. However, this support is indirect and contingent on several factors. The credibility of stablecoins ultimately rests on robust regulation, transparency of reserves, sound governance and reliable convertibility into fiat dollars. To the extent that stablecoins are well regulated, fully backed by high‑quality USD assets and interoperable with the traditional financial system, they can reinforce dollar dominance by entrenching its role as the unit of account and medium of exchange in the digital economy.

Stablecoins will complement the USD’s reserve role by extending how and where the dollar is used. By enabling near-instant and low-cost cross-border payments and settlement, stablecoins will increase the transactional demand for the dollar. Furthermore, it will create additional demand for safe USD assets, as stablecoins, by design, are pegged to an asset, whether fiat, commodity or crypto. In this instance, fiat-backed stablecoins will increase the demand for US Treasuries or cash equivalents, thereby indirectly supporting demand for US government debt.

The growth of the stablecoin market may have an impact on the role of the USD; however, it is difficult to make any forecasts at this stage.

Unsure. While USD-backed stablecoins may extend the dollar’s use in digital payments, regulatory and structural uncertainties make their long-term impact on the dollar’s reserve role unclear.

USD-linked stablecoins may reinforce the dollar’s use in payments and cross-border transactions, but they [are not a] substitute for the institutional, legal and market foundations that underpin the USD’s role as a reserve currency.

14a. What percentage of global reserves do you think will be invested in the renminbi?

I have been very sceptical about renminbi as a reserve currency, and this view has not changed.

I would have to choose the more attractive currency for the lack of better options. I do not think RMB, also the USD, has grown to be a more reliable and stronger reserve asset.

In the coming years, the renminbi’s share in global reserves is unlikely to increase significantly, although it may be supported by its growing role in regional trade flows, increasing integration within the global financial system and further reforms aimed at increasing openness, transparency and liquidity of Chinese financial markets. But its overall attractiveness is impacted by geopolitical factors, regulatory barriers, as well as structural issues, and weakened economic growth prospects in China.

It is expected that the percentage of global reserves in the renminbi will not increase significantly, and will remain in the range of 2–3%.

It is possible it may reach around 10% if the US continues to self-destruct.

Our view on the renminbi as a reserve currency has not changed. Although we have not seen a significant increase in the renminbi’s share of official FX reserves in recent years (based on IMF Cofer data), we believe that, in the long run, the RMB’s share will continue to increase.

Renminbi could benefit somewhat from the de-dollarisation trend. We have not changed [our] views on renminbi as a reserve currency.

Share of renminbi has been growing rather slowly in recent years (even falling in recent periods). We expect this slow trend to continue due to geopolitical risks. Other currencies might see an increase in their shares, such as EUR, GBP, JPY, SEK, NOK.

The central bank does not invest in any instruments in renminbi, but it is considering analysing them in the future.

The lack of transparency of economic data in China negatively impacts the position of its currency. Still, due to China’s dimension in the global market, the share of global reserves invested in renminbi should increase slightly.

The renminbi has made some progress as an international currency, but its relevance continues to be limited, and not proportional to the size and weight of the Chinese economy.

The renminbi’s share in global reserves is expected to rise gradually, constrained by capital controls, market liquidity and transparency considerations, despite its growing role in trade settlement.

The renminbi’s share of global reserves is expected to increase gradually, supported by China’s role in global trade, broader use of the currency in bilateral settlement arrangements and targeted diversification efforts by some reserve managers. However, progress is likely to remain incremental, rather than transformational.

The renminbi’s share of global reserves is expected to rise gradually as central banks continue to diversify and China deepens its financial markets. However, capital controls, limited market liquidity and governance concerns are likely to constrain the pace of increase – implying steady but incremental growth, rather than a rapid shift.

The share of global foreign exchange reserves held in renminbi will increase gradually, rather than sharply. The projected 3–4% reflects continued incremental diversification by some reserve managers. As the use of RMB in trade settlement expands and comfort with RMB-denominated assets increases, particularly among emerging markets, the percentage of global reserves invested in RMB could rise to ~4–6%. Lastly, if there are significant reforms to capital account openness and institutional transparency, the share can increase to ~6–7% by 2035.

There is a need to deepen the internationalisation of the renminbi.

This will depend on changes to the market environment.

US tariffs may push other countries to deepen trade ties with China, increasing the use of the RMB and gradually boosting its role in global reserves.

We do not have an official view on this question.

We have not changed our view on the renminbi over the last year.

We think that the share of total reserves investing in renminbi will remain relatively stable in the following 10 years.

When the geopolitics tensions are solved, China will become a more attractive issuer.

14b. What percentage of your reserves do you plan to invest in renminbi?

Due to legal restrictions, the central bank does not plan to invest in renminbi.

Expected to increase over time due to increased trade with China.

In our renminbi investments, we focus on broadening the eligible asset classes and improving the efficiency of our operations.

Our planned allocation to the renminbi will be gradual and measured, reflecting both its increasing use in global trade and settlement, and our focus on maintaining portfolio resilience and liquidity. By the end of 2030, we anticipate allocating around 3% of our reserves, increasing to approximately 5% by 2035. This approach aligns with broader trends in global reserve diversification, while recognising that the renminbi is likely to remain a complementary, rather than core, reserve currency over the medium term.

Renminbi reserve holdings are likely to rise gradually, supported by China’s growing role in global trade.

The central bank will continue to monitor the long-term prospects in RMB-denominated assets, considering developments in the Chinese economy and its financial markets.

The idea to allocate part of our reserves to renminbi has never come up.

The percentage of investment in renminbi will depend on the decision of the authorities.

The SAA exercise is conducted on an annual basis. This is simply an educated guess, based on the recent evolution of the currency allocation and the broader process of currency diversification that has been taking place.

The US dollar is the dominant currency among our trading partners. Accordingly, reserves are held in USD, while payments in renminbi are not relevant.

There are no current plans to allocate reserves to renminbi.

We do not foresee any investments in renminbi.

We do not yet have a plan of how much to invest in renminbi.

We hold CNY for diversification purposes, as well as in consequence of the swap lines with China. However, our currency allocation is mainly determined during the SAA process, [which] depends on [the] asset-liability matching principle. Thereby, we think that the share of CNY in our reserves will stay limited unless there is a significant increase in our swap lines with China.

We invested a small part of our reserves in renminbi, and we do not have any plans to change that allocation.

15c. What is the main hurdle for your institution to start investing in euro-denominated assets, or increase current allocations?

An increase in euro allocation above 60% has an impact on the FX risk the bank is managing.

Current exposure is appropriate relative to other reserve assets.

EUR offers a developed payment system, mature financial markets, stable financial system – second only to the US market. Its role could be further strengthened through stronger economic growth, reduction in structural problems and fiscal consolidation, decline in political uncertainty and measures to reduce financial market fragmentation.

Euro is our domestic currency.

Eurozone central bank.

Given the exchange rate regime and the predominance of the US dollar in trade, financial flows, and reserve management operations, USD-denominated assets remain more suitable than euro-denominated alternatives.

If the bank had more funds, we would invest in more euro assets.

Low yields, limited high-quality liquid assets, and credit/growth concerns in the eurozone are the main hurdles to increasing euro allocations.

No hurdles, really – planning to reintroduce the euro portfolio that was closed in 2020. Lack of a sufficient supply of high-quality liquid assets could be a hurdle, but we’ll see.

Our currency allocation is determined by the SAA that is based on the asset-liability matching principle. Thereby the share of euro in our reserve portfolios depends on the currency structure of our FX liabilities and the course it will follow, as well as the expected trajectory of the Eurodollar parity.

Over the past year, while rhetoric around de-dollarisation initially suggested the euro might gain as a reserve currency, our view has become less positive. Gold has emerged as a more prominent reserve asset, and the euro faces challenges that limit its appeal, including low yields relative to the dollar, weaker growth prospects and credit deterioration risks. Divergent national interests within the EU create uncertainty about the long-term stability of the euro, and without deeper fiscal integration, more unified debt issuance and stronger geopolitical influence, it is unlikely to rival the US dollar as a core reserve currency.

The central bank maintains accounts in euros solely for [public-sector payments] in that currency.

The euro remains an important reserve currency, but its relative attractiveness is constrained by yield differentials, growth outlook and political uncertainty.

The Eurobond market is also fragmented, which complicates operations, as counterparties are typically needed for each individual country, given the differences in rules and market practices. Additionally, trading hours for euro-denominated products do not always overlap with the Americas, which can further complicate execution – particularly in scenarios where immediate liquidity is required.

The government has pegged its currency to the euro. Therefore, more than 99% of its foreign exchange reserves are denominated in euros. There are no obstacles to invest in euro-denominated assets or to increase current allocations. We also invest in US dollars, but currency diversification is strictly limited by law.

The region remains unattractive amid weak growth, political instability and limited reform momentum. Elevated debt and deficits alongside low trend growth heighten the risk of renewed debt pressures. Structural productivity weakness weighs on growth prospects, while exposure to potential US tariffs and trade policy uncertainty clouds the outlook for exports and investment.

There is no hurdle to increase current EUR allocation, especially if the government decides to issue a new EUR bond to strengthen foreign reserves.

We do not view any material hurdles to investing in euro-denominated assets or increasing current allocations. As more than 90% of our reserves are already held in euros, this currency is fully aligned with our operational, policy and reserve management framework.

We have increased our exposure to euro-denominated assets by the end of 2025 in the SAA for 2026.

We maintain a small position in euros for servicing occasional payments in that currency. The main reason for not increasing our investment in euros is related to operating issues that affect our capacity to effectively invest in euro-denominated assets.

16a. The price of gold has doubled since the start of 2024, resulting in gold passively becoming a higher proportion of overall reserves. Is this affecting your reserve management decision-making?

As a central bank, gold is very important to be included in our reserves. It is a safe-haven asset.

Considering an indirect exposure to gold.

Consider[ing] investing in it for higher returns.

Currently, the central bank does not carry out SAA. In the exercises that have been conducted, gold is kept separate. Only a small portion of the monetary gold is invested in gold deposits. Investment decisions regarding gold are made by the authorities.

Despite not directly buying any gold, gold is now a greater portion of our reserves, and this has forced us to rethink our allocation to gold.

Evaluation of overall gold risk.

Gold has become increasingly attractive due to uncertainty in global financial markets.

Gold is held as a strategic asset in a separate tranche. Gold is not included in the optimisation process.

It has become a more attractive asset to invest in. However, because the increase is driven by prices, concentration risk is a challenge.

Our investment policy limits the proportion invested in gold to 10%. As a result, an increase in gold prices may cause this limit to be exceeded.

Our position in gold has increased due to the increase [in] gold’s price (not due to acquisition of more gold), and, as such, our reserves are increasingly skewed to gold.

The price volatility of gold makes it difficult to include in our SAA, given low risk tolerance for loss over a short investment horizon.

This is not applicable. We are not currently investing in gold, despite it being an eligible asset class in our investment policy.

We are considering acquiring gold. However, the high price is a concern that may affect the percentage allocation to gold.

We are not invested in gold.

We currently have no exposure to gold.

We currently trade in unallocated gold. With high price[s], unable to buy physical gold at this stage for reserve management, alternative to cash.

We do not have gold in our reserves, and have no plan to buy.

We exclude gold from SAA, so no impact on allocations.

Yes. Although we currently do not hold gold in our reserves, we are planning to initiate an allocation this year. The recent sharp increase in gold prices is therefore an important consideration from a timing and cost perspective, as it affects entry levels, while the strategic rationale for holding gold as a diversification and safety asset remains unchanged.

16b. What strategies are you considering with respect to gold holdings in the coming year?

Considerations are being made on the plausibility and prospects of investing in gold.

Decisions regarding the sale or purchase of gold are made by the authorities.

Gold accumulation and trading is considered a good strategy.

Gold holdings are expected to remain stable, with a focus on safekeeping, rather than active management or tactical adjustments.

Gold remains the most attractive asset at the moment, with its value having increased considerably.

In the proposed new foreign reserves mandate, we could increase exposure to gold, for example, via ETFs.

No change to how gold [is] managed.

Over the coming year, we intend to maintain a prudent and active approach to gold holdings, primarily focusing on managing exposure via deposits and swaps. Gold will continue to serve as a store of value and portfolio diversifier, with hedging strategies employed to protect against market volatility. While we are not currently planning significant additions or sales, ongoing monitoring of market conditions may inform tactical adjustments.

This is not applicable. We are not currently investing in gold, despite it being an eligible asset class in our investment policy.

To ensure the value is protected.

We are planning to conduct gold deposits when rates are favourable.

We continue the process of gradually increasing gold holdings, which are treated as a strategic asset.

We do not own gold, and have no plans to do so.

We have a very small gold holding, and we do not actively manage it.

We plan to maintain and slightly increase gold holdings while actively managing exposure through deposits, swaps and derivatives, hedging to protect value, and diversifying custody locations to reduce risk.

16e. What in your evaluation will the price of gold be by the end of 2026?

A bit higher than today, but [the] strong upward trend will slow down.

After the recent spike above $5,000 [per ounce] and the sharp correction that followed, it is clear that prices had moved well beyond fundamental drivers. A more realistic path would be some stabilisation, with gold potentially ending the year closer to $4,000 [per ounce].

Around $6,000 per ounce if geopolitical conflicts escalate and there is aggressive Fed easing – but if geopolitical tension moderates, then it could stay range-bound.

Based on our evaluation of macroeconomic trends, geopolitical risks and inflation dynamics, we expect the price of gold to reach approximately $5,000 per ounce by the end of 2026.

Currently keeping the allocation constant irrespective of the price.

Decision on gold purchase[s] is not the function of [the] gold price only, it should reflect strategic/long-term decision[s].

Expect further increases, but at a slower pace than one observed in the past weeks.

Fluctuate around the current price.

Gold continues to serve as a safe-haven asset and portfolio diversifier, with its valuation influenced by geopolitical developments, currency movements, interest rate expectations, and global demand from central banks and investors.

Gold is a historic legacy asset, and we have a significant exposure to it, therefore we are not planning to purchase gold.

Gold price can hit all time at $6,000 per ounce.

Gold prices should remain stable at current record highs, but we do not foresee a similar performance as last year.

Goldman Sachs raised its 2026 year‑end forecast from $4,900 to $5,400 per ounce, citing continued private‑sector and central bank diversification into gold. Also, Bank of America forecasts gold at $5,000 [per ounce] in 2026, driven by fiscal deficits, a softer dollar and strong central bank accumulation. This outlook is consistent with the position of the central bank.

It is very difficult to answer this question due to the particular characteristics of gold and the difficulty in assessing the level of leverage involved.

It will probably continue to rise, but we do not have a specific target.

No plans to change gold allocation.

Ongoing official-sector demand and geopolitical hedging support.

The gold price is expected [to be] around $5,500 [per ounce] due to ongoing geopolitical tensions, volatile inflation, shifts in monetary policy and continued demand for safe-haven assets amid subdued global growth and fiscal uncertainties.

The price of gold is expected to continue rising this year due to prospects of US interest rate cuts, political conflicts and economic outlook.

The price will continue rising.

We do not have a specific threshold buying price, but we would be cautious if it goes somewhat above $5,000 [per ounce].

We do not have any plans to increase gold holdings.

We do not forecast the price of gold.

We do not know, as the price is currently volatile.

We purchase domestic gold at the given market price.

17a. Are you considering a change in the weighting of equities in your reserve portfolio?

Central bank law restriction.

Do not invest in equity.

Equities are not an approved asset class in our reserve management policy.

Equities are not approved under the investment policy.

Equities could be treated as a natural hedge to government bonds. Before a government can pay the ‘risk-free’ government bond, it must collect taxes. Therefore, without having a functioning economy, government bonds are not a risk-free asset.

European equities offer structural exposure to industrial, financial and green investment themes, while emerging-market equities benefit from long-term growth, demographics and policy support.

Geopolitical tensions.

Investment policy currently excludes equity investments. Low level[s] of reserves do not [allow this] due to the volatile nature of equity returns.

Levels of reserves.

Mainly diversification.

Matching … the country’s liabilities and trade patterns.

New foreign reserves mandate. If accepted, then we could invest in US and/or European equities, most likely via ETFs.

No investments are made in equities.

Not allowed by charter.

Not an active asset class.

Our long-term investment strategy assumes gradual increasing of exposure towards equities, but the exact timing will depend on market conditions. We have already increased our equity exposure over recent years, investing in equities in all our reserve currencies.

Over the next 12 months, we may increase the allocation to equities in our reserve portfolio, with adjustments across developed- and emerging-market equities and selective sector exposures, including technology. Decisions are guided by expected returns, risk-adjusted diversification benefits, and macroeconomic and geopolitical developments. Regional considerations, including the outlook for the US and European markets, inform tactical positioning, while maintaining alignment with the portfolio’s core objectives of safety, liquidity and capital preservation.

Performance indicators point to overvaluation in the US equity market, higher exposure to [the] tech sector in the US market, and a positive outlook for the European economy and equity market.

We do not invest in equities.

We do not plan any changes to our equity exposure.

While they offer high returns, they also carry risks from market volatility and economic conditions.

18c. Do you think slow adoption of AI could put reserve managers at a disadvantage?

AI adoption should be gradual and aligned with governance, data-quality and risk controls. For reserve managers, institutional frameworks and risk discipline remain more critical than speed of adoption.

AI can enhance data analysis, risk management and predictive forecasting. Without it, managers may react more slowly to market shifts, miss opportunities for portfolio optimisation, and struggle to efficiently process the large volumes of financial and economic data needed to make informed decisions.

AI can enhance foreign reserve investment mainly by improving data-processing, monitoring and reporting efficiency. However, portfolio management and investment decisions still depend on human judgement, experience and qualitative assessment, especially under uncertainty. Human capital therefore remains decisive, with AI acting as a complement, rather than a substitute.

AI technology can be beneficial for different areas: trading and execution, strategic asset allocation, reporting, etc.

All advantages of AI are likely taken advantage of by other investors, meaning the potential to gain alpha has already gone.

Cautious approach preferred until [there is] regulatory clarity.

Currently not, but in the future, those who make decisions based on advanced tools may have advantages over those who do not.

Efficiency in optimisation for strategic and tactical asset allocation will improve results. If central banks are not efficient vis-à-vis the rest of the market, there is a risk of losing comparative advantage in investment and trade execution.

If a reserve manager lags in AI adoption, it will identify macrofinancial risks later than its peers, potentially misreading global trends. It will also suboptimise portfolio choices, as AI helps asset-allocation decision models, and they will face higher operational risks, as AI helps improve efficiency.

It reduces efficiency. Prevents managers from optimising portfolio management.

It will prevent them from benefiting from algorithmic trading, which brings in capabilities to utilise large data and predict and incorporate market-moving events in portfolio decision-making. Inability to refine data and enhance operations throughout reserves management process.

It would facilitate access to real-time news and data while enabling process automation with minimal additional operational cost and reduced potential for errors.

Mixed thoughts. AI offers efficiency and analytical benefits, but reserve management still depends primarily on expert judgement and strong governance, making cautious adoption more appropriate than rapid implementation.

[No.] Based on asset classes we typically invest in.

Our current reserve level is still manageable without AI.

Recent forums and conferences have highlighted the need to incorporate AI into foreign reserves management, an area we can explore in the near future.

Reserve management is a highly customised role, as each central bank faces different risks and has different portfolio compositions. AI currently is not capable [of devising] strategies that are this customisable.

Reserve managers have to think about what tasks can be confidently delegated to AI, taking care to minimise black-box risk. There may also be institutional constraints, as central banks have to evaluate data governance, privacy and security considerations.

Slow adoption of AI could certainly put reserve managers at a disadvantage, particularly in terms of operational efficiency and risk management. While AI is not yet driving core investment strategy, it is increasingly essential for optimising existing processes, such as liquidity forecasting and real-time monitoring of market volatility. Managers who fail to integrate these tools may face higher operational costs and slower reaction times compared to peers using AI to navigate complex, data-heavy environments.

Slow AI adoption could limit data analysis, portfolio optimisation and rapid response to market changes, putting reserve managers at a relative disadvantage.

Slow AI adoption could put reserve managers at a disadvantage because AI tools can enhance risk monitoring, scenario analysis and operational efficiency. Delayed adoption may limit timely insights, reduce competitiveness in managing returns and risks, and make it harder to keep pace with peers who are using AI to support faster, data-driven decision-making.

Slow AI adoption leaves reserves less adaptive, raising risks and causing managers to lag peers in performance.

The use of AI tools can enhance the efficiency of the foreign exchange reserves management process, although it may also generate operational risks related to data confidentiality, false signals (hallucination) and misinterpretation of results. The specific nature of the central bank’s operations and the priorities of foreign exchange reserves management may to some extent make the central bank resistant to the development of new technologies.

The use of artificial intelligence in our institution should go through certain compliance areas, since, as a public institution, everything is auditable, and it is necessary to create a manual or guideline for its use.

Use of AI allows for greater efficiency and focus on more value-[added] activities.

We are actively involved in different workstreams that deal with implementing AI into the central bank’s processes.

We are experimenting with AI primarily in reporting. While broader adoption is still in its early stages, AI has the potential to enhance analytical capabilities, improve efficiency and support more informed decision-making. Slow adoption could put reserve managers at a disadvantage relative to peers, particularly in areas such as risk monitoring, scenario analysis and portfolio optimisation, where timely and data-driven insights are increasingly valuable.

We are using AI for market monitoring and analysis.

We have answered yes to this question, but we do not see the risk as absolute, but relative because it depends on how peers and counterparties are evolving. If the entire reserve management industry adopts slowly, then there is little risk, as there is no competition between reserve managers and other market participants, given the objectives of reserve managers. Central banks are being cautious in AI deployment, given their conservative mandates.

We still believe that machines cannot replace humans in making investment decisions in an equal manner.

We use it in ideas generation for SAA and reporting.

Yes, slow adoption of AI could put reserve managers at a disadvantage because AI is increasingly useful for data analysis, risk monitoring, portfolio optimisation and market intelligence. Managers using AI can process large macro, FX and bond datasets faster, identify trends earlier and improve decision-making, which can enhance returns and risk control. Those who delay adoption may face slower reaction times, less efficient portfolio management and weaker competitive positioning, especially as markets become more data-driven. However, careful implementation is still important to avoid overreliance on models and ensure proper governance.

19. Has your prioritisation of sustainable investing changed over the last 12 months?

ESG investment is spearheaded through various regional and international groups, which the central bank forms part of. There is a greater national level buy-in to adopt ESG frameworks for investment and within central bank operations.

Increase in funds invested in ESG bonds.

Interest in prioritisation has increased and sustainable policy frameworks still being drafted alongside [a] central bank-wide ESG policy. Nevertheless, it has been integrated with the bank’s fund manager mandates.

It continues to be a consideration within the investment process, but only after the traditional objectives of safety, liquidity and return have been met.

It has increased because it is one of the objectives of our foreign reserves management.

Not yet considered.

Our prioritisation of sustainable investing has remained unchanged over the past 12 months. While we do not have a formal ESG framework, we invest opportunistically in labelled green, social or sustainability bonds when they align with our portfolio objectives, risk limits and liquidity requirements.

Sustainable investing considerations continue to be assessed within the existing investment framework.

Sustainable investing not incorporated in reserves management.

Sustainability is part of our investment objectives.

The [central] bank is seeking to green its investments.

We developed a formal policy around sustainable investing.

We have increased the share of green bonds in our securities portfolio, reflecting our commitment to sustainable investment practices, while maintaining the core objectives of safety, liquidity and return.

We include sustainability as one of our investment principles, together with capital preservation, liquidity and return.

While sustainable investing is an area of increased focus, it is still not seen as a priority.

19c. Which in your view are the most significant obstacles to incorporating sustainable investing into reserve management?

A key obstacle to implementation has been the fact that the bank’s ESG policy remains in draft form. This has created challenges in aligning and effectively implementing a sustainable investment policy framework in the absence of an approved, bank-wide ESG policy. These two policies are to be aligned to the nation’s sustainability priorities, which are still being drafted, too.

All are relevant.

Challenge of integration with central bank mandate and concern over liquidity/returns are the main obstacles we see for incorporating sustainable investing in our FX reserves management.

Current challenge relates to capacity and availability of data/information to ensure alignment of activities with central bank mandate.

Incorporating sustainable investing requires careful alignment with the central bank mandate, and relies on the availability of consistent and reliable data.

Key obstacles are liquidity/return concerns, limited ESG data and integration with the central bank mandate. Asset scarcity and greenwashing risks are secondary.

My main obstacle is the mandate. Central banks are financially very rich, and, in the past, they bore some costs of market stability because they had unlimited currency-issuance capacities. That can apply to the domestic market and domestic currency. But as for reserve currencies, why should a central bank from country X be financing green policy in country Y?

None for now.

Not a priority.

Our investment counterparts provide a broad range of environmentally sustainable investment options, and our policy allows us to invest in them.

The central bank has not incorporated sustainable investing into its foreign reserve mandate. Main overall concerns are as before – risk/liquidity/return – when selecting assets.

The main obstacles are data limitations and inconsistencies, difficulties aligning sustainability goals with core objectives such as liquidity, safety and return, limited eligible investment universes, and the risk of politicisation or mandate creep.

The most significant obstacle is aligning sustainable investing approaches with the core central bank mandate – safety, liquidity and return. While the other concerns – data availability and reputational risks – remain relevant, these challenges are increasingly manageable as frameworks and market practices evolve. The scarcity of investable assets is the least significant, given the gradual expansion of eligible instruments in global markets.

The most significant obstacle to incorporating sustainable investing into reserve management remains the challenge of integrating ESG considerations with the central bank’s core mandate, which focuses on high-quality sovereign bonds such as US Treasuries, many of which are not ESG-labelled. Scrutiny around greenwashing or greenhushing also presents a notable challenge, complicating the assessment of genuinely sustainable investments. Other factors – including the scarcity of investable assets, concerns over liquidity and returns, and insufficient data or reporting – are secondary, but continue to influence the pace and scope of ESG adoption.

The obstacles are mainly practical. The limited pool of eligible ESG assets and gaps in consistent data make integration difficult in day-to-day reserve management, whereas mandate alignment and liquidity concerns are less restrictive in practice.

We follow PAB/CTB [Paris-Aligned Benchmark/Climate Transition Benchmark] principles in equity investments, and a big part of our SSA investments are only in green bonds, but it is very difficult to find green sovereign bonds.

When our reserves position improves, we might consider this avenue.

While managing foreign reserves, central banks usually play the role of long-term, market-neutral investors. Sustainability goals are mainly within the government’s mandate, and SRI initiatives could interfere with national policy and impact central bank independence. Besides, SRI is conditional on access to adequate, reliable, coherent, transparent data – and this still may be a challenge.