IMF research discusses 'sub-optimal' nature of non-independent central banks

International Monetary Fund headquarters

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper, published in April, considers the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and take monetary policy decisions.

Authors Kenichi Ueda and Fabián Valencia write that if either the central bank or the macro-prudential regulator, or both, are not politically independent, then they do not deliver socially optimal outcomes.

The researchers find that "dual mandate" central banks deliver sub

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