Brookings paper examines impact of governance structures on use of CCyBs

capital framework

Countries with financial stability committees with strong governance mechanisms are more likely to implement countercyclical capital buffers (CCyBs) than those with weaker governance, a paper published by the Brookings Institution finds.

Using data from 58 countries, Rochelle Edge and Nellie Lang examine whether new governance structures for managing macro-prudential policy, including “multi-agency financial stability committees” (FSCs), affect decisions to implement CCyBs.

They find that

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