The toxicology of post-crisis shadow banking

Did Mark Carney tempt fate when he declared most toxic forms of shadow banking “no longer represent a global stability risk”?

Warning labels

On August 8, 2007, around $1.2 trillion was outstanding in asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) in the US, worth around 8% of GDP that year. Investors holding the paper were about to step off a cliff. Word spread rapidly of the problems associated with the junk mortgages underpinning the market, and investors, who were able to access their funds on demand at par value, fled. Within a week, the market contracted by $30 billion, and by the end of the month, $190 billion.

ABCP programmes demanded

Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.

To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact or view our subscription options here:

You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact to find out more.

Sorry, our subscription options are not loading right now

Please try again later. Get in touch with our customer services team if this issue persists.

New to Central Banking? View our subscription options

Register for Central Banking

All fields are mandatory unless otherwise highlighted

This address will be used to create your account

You need to sign in to use this feature. If you don’t have a Central Banking account, please register for a trial.

Sign in
You are currently on corporate access.

To use this feature you will need an individual account. If you have one already please sign in.

Sign in.

Alternatively you can request an individual account