Journal of Economics and Business paper

RESEARCH - Information asymmetry in disclosure of foreign exchange risk management: can regulation be effective? By Andrew P. Marshall and Pauline Weetman.

Department of Accounting & Finance, Curran Building, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, G4 0LN, Scotland, UK. Journal of Economics and Business, Volume 54, Issue 1, 01-January-2002


A reduction in information asymmetry, and hence in the monitoring burden between agent and principal, is one of the aims of the regulation of financial

Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.

To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact or view our subscription options here:

You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact to find out more.

Sorry, our subscription options are not loading right now

Please try again later. Get in touch with our customer services team if this issue persists.

New to Central Banking? View our subscription options

If you already have an account, please sign in here.

You need to sign in to use this feature. If you don’t have a Central Banking account, please register for a trial.

Sign in
You are currently on corporate access.

To use this feature you will need an individual account. If you have one already please sign in.

Sign in.

Alternatively you can request an individual account