Why deflation is different

In the two decades since the long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation was rejected by most economists and central bankers, independence of the central bank from political pressure has been thought necessary to ensure a reasonable balance between the two objectives. Politicians with shorter time horizons are considered more likely than central bankers to over-emphasise the employment objective. Central banks that were formally independent, such as the Federal Reserve in the United

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