Competition in treasury auctions reduces bidder surplus, working paper finds

The National Bank of Austria

Increased competition in sovereign bond auctions considerably reduces bidder surplus, a working paper published by the National Bank of Austria argues.

In Competition in treasury auctions, Helmut Elsinger, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler and Christine Zulehner look at evidence from Austria’s experience after it joined the European Union in 1995.

Before then, only domestic banks could buy Austrian Treasury bonds, but bidding was opened to banks from all EU states after 1995.

The authors find the change

Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.

To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact or view our subscription options here:

You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact to find out more.

Sorry, our subscription options are not loading right now

Please try again later. Get in touch with our customer services team if this issue persists.

New to Central Banking? View our subscription options

Register for Central Banking

All fields are mandatory unless otherwise highlighted

This address will be used to create your account

You need to sign in to use this feature. If you don’t have a Central Banking account, please register for a trial.

Sign in
You are currently on corporate access.

To use this feature you will need an individual account. If you have one already please sign in.

Sign in.

Alternatively you can request an individual account