The economics of money laundering enforcement

The IMF Working Paper 'A theory of "crying wolf": The economics of money laundering enforcement' shows how excessive reporting, called "crying wolf", can dilute the information value of reports.

Excessive reporting is investigated by undertaking the first formal analysis of money laundering enforcement. Banks monitor transactions and report suspicious activity to government agencies, which use these reports to identify investigation targets. Banks face fines should they fail to report money

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