Paper on monetary policy by committee

Central Banking staff
17 Jan 2007

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The Meeting Paper from the Society for Economic Dynamics 'The dynamic (in)efficiency of monetary policy by committee' develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game.

Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are

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