Bank supervision Russian style

The Working Paper "Bank supervision Russian style: Rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives" from the William Davidson Institute focuses on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability.

We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license

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