Central Banks and Supreme Courts by C Goodhart

This Working Paper from the Financial Markets Group claims that a significant, large part of the reason for the differing procedures of the legal and monetary policy bodies in the UK, USA, and EU derives from a political science root. How do you deal with effective power in the shape of goal independence in a democratic society it asks?

Working Paper by Charles Goodhart, Deputy Director of the Financial Markets Group and Norman Sosnow Professor of Banking and Finance at the London School of

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