IMF paper on goal-independent central banks

The IMF Working Paper "Goal-independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate" develops a model which explains why the expected negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation is not empirically robust.

A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and

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