Elements of optimal monetary policy design

This International Monetary Fund Working Paper reviews the relevant economics and social psychology literatures with a view to providing some insights into the question of optimal monetary policy committee design.

The move from individual decision making to committee decision making is widely seen as a major evolution in contemporary central banking. While the preference aggregation literature points to the effect of committee structure on the extent of the time inconsistency problem and its

Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.

To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact info@centralbanking.com or view our subscription options here: http://subscriptions.centralbanking.com/subscribe

You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact info@centralbanking.com to find out more.

Sorry, our subscription options are not loading right now

Please try again later. Get in touch with our customer services team if this issue persists.

New to Central Banking? View our subscription options

Register for Central Banking

All fields are mandatory unless otherwise highlighted

This address will be used to create your account