The costs of increasing transparency

This Working Paper from De Nederlandsche Bank, published January 2006, sets up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which is modelled explicitly, and the private sector. The authors show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency.

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (2005) however has disputed this by saying

Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.

To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact [email protected] or view our subscription options here:

You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact [email protected] to find out more.

To continue reading...

You need to sign in to use this feature. If you don’t have a Central Banking account, please register for a trial.

Sign in
You are currently on corporate access.

To use this feature you will need an individual account. If you have one already please sign in.

Sign in.

Alternatively you can request an individual account here: