Skip to main content

Economics in central banking: Bruno Tiberto

The Brazilian economist’s work delivers a robust study of how independence affects inequality, at a critical time for the BCB’s autonomy

Bruno Tiberto

In February 2021, long-awaited legislation was passed granting the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) operational independence from government. The law strengthened the BCB’s ability to pursue price stability without government interference but left out a crucial element: financial autonomy. The government still sets salaries and budgets at the BCB, giving it a powerful source of leverage over the central bank.

That may be set to change, with a new constitutional amendment currently being debated in

Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.

To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact info@centralbanking.com or view our subscription options here: www.centralbanking.com/subscriptions

You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact info@centralbanking.com to find out more.

Sorry, our subscription options are not loading right now

Please try again later. Get in touch with our customer services team if this issue persists.

New to Central Banking? View our subscription options

Register for Central Banking

All fields are mandatory unless otherwise highlighted

Show password
Hide password

Most read articles loading...

You need to sign in to use this feature. If you don’t have a Central Banking account, please register for a trial.

Sign in
You are currently on corporate access.

To use this feature you will need an individual account. If you have one already please sign in.

Sign in.

Alternatively you can request an individual account

.