Economics in central banking: Bruno Tiberto
The Brazilian economist’s work delivers a robust study of how independence affects inequality, at a critical time for the BCB’s autonomy
In February 2021, long-awaited legislation was passed granting the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) operational independence from government. The law strengthened the BCB’s ability to pursue price stability without government interference but left out a crucial element: financial autonomy. The government still sets salaries and budgets at the BCB, giving it a powerful source of leverage over the central bank.
That may be set to change, with a new constitutional amendment currently being debated in
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