Weaker shareholder liability need not mean more risk-taking, Riksbank paper finds

Authors find depositors held their banks to account

Photo by David Lundberg
Sveriges Riksbank. Photo by David Lundberg

Reducing the incentive for shareholders to hold their banks to account need not entail an increase in bank risk-taking, according to research published on February 4 by Sweden's Sveriges Riksbank.

The working paper, Double Liability in a Branch Banking System: Historical Evidence from Canada, by Anna Grodecka and Antonis Kotidis, examines the phase-out of double liability after the Bank of Canada was established in 1934. Double liability saw shareholders liable for double their investment in

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