Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives

RESEARCH - Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling by Stefan Palmqvist of the University of California, Berkeley and Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University.

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the use of announcements of objectives or intentions, announcements which are common in implementation of monetary policy. To analyze such announcements, this paper uses a model in which there is asymmetric information over the central

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