Iraq’s central bank: in search of a raison d’être

In September of 2003 we published a largely speculative assessment of Iraq's money and banking system1. We concluded that central banking in Iraq would be inadvisable, if not infeasible, should our expectations prove correct. We anticipated that there would be fundamental problems with human capital and knowledge: official and private sector personnel would have to adapt to business in a market economy, and economic data would be scarce, if not irrelevant. There were reasons to worry about the

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