Richmond Fed paper examines triggers for contingent capital conversion

Working paper sees link between desirability of different triggers and ‘conversion rule’

Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Whether a regulator or fixed-price mechanism is more suitable for triggering the conversion of debt into equity depends on the ‘conversion rule', new research published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond finds.

In the working paper, Fixed Prices and Regulatory Discretion as Triggers for Contingent Capital Conversion: An Experimental Examination, Douglas Davis and Edward Prescott define the conversion rule as "the effect of the conversion on the value of equity to incumbent equity owners".

"

Only users who have a paid subscription or are part of a corporate subscription are able to print or copy content.

To access these options, along with all other subscription benefits, please contact info@centralbanking.com or view our subscription options here: http://subscriptions.centralbanking.com/subscribe

You are currently unable to copy this content. Please contact info@centralbanking.com to find out more.

Sorry, our subscription options are not loading right now

Please try again later. Get in touch with our customer services team if this issue persists.

New to Central Banking? View our subscription options

Register for Central Banking

All fields are mandatory unless otherwise highlighted

This address will be used to create your account

You need to sign in to use this feature. If you don’t have a Central Banking account, please register for a trial.

Sign in
You are currently on corporate access.

To use this feature you will need an individual account. If you have one already please sign in.

Sign in.

Alternatively you can request an individual account

.